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Summary findings
Social pension systems in most countries in Eastern  in the longer run for nonemployer, defined contribution
Europe and the former Soviet Union face severe financial  plans based on individual capitalization accounts with
pressure. Aging populations are increasing that pressure,  full immediate vesting, full portability, and full funding.
which stems mainly from design flaws and incompatible  To cope with the need for a targeted replacement rate,
incentives in the systems.  such schemes could operate with variable contribution
Vittas and Michelitsch describe the features of the  rates, reset each year in accord with the salary growth of
pension systems that have led to the current dire  each worker, the cumulative investment return on his/her
predicament:  a big discrepancy between system and  account, and the targeted pension benefit.
demographic dependency ratios, unsustainable targeted  Once private pension funds are established, long-term
replacement rates, the high contribution  rates needed,  financial resources should accumulate rapidly. They can
growing evasion, and growing deficits.  then play a major role in modernizing securities markets,
Radical basic reform is inevitable, they say, but may  stimulating innovation, fostering better accounting and
not be politically feasible or even advisable in the short  auditing standards, and promoting more disclosure of
run.  information.
After reviewing experience in other countries, they  They could also greatly help improve corporate
conclude that restructuring and downsizing the social  governance and the monitoring of corporate
pension system will leave adequate but affordable (thus  performance. Their "voice" in corporate  affairs could be
sustainable) benefits and will allow for the creation and  exercised more effectively through collective bodies.
growth of private pension funds.  They could thus help create more robust structures of
The shortcomings of company-based defined benefit  corporate governance, lower monitoring costs, and avoid
plans (limited portability, restricted vesting, inadequate  the problems caused by "free riding."
funding) suggest that transitional economies should opt
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PENSION  FUNDS
IN
CENTRAL  EUROPE  AND  RUSSIA
THEIR  PROSPECTS  AND POTENTIAL  ROLE
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CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE
Dimitri Vittas and Roland Michelitsch
This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the Conference
on  Corporate  Governance  in  Central  Europe  and  Russia,  that  was
organized on  December  15 and  16, 1994 by the  World Bank and the
Central European University Privatization Project.  Our special thanks,
with the usual disclaimer, are due to Dale Hanson and Cheryl Gray.I.  INTRODUCTION  AND SUMMARY
A.  Pension Funds and Enterprise Restructuring
Writing about the role of pension funds in corporate governance in Central European countries
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and Russia is faced with two major difficulties.  First, at the
time  of writing  this  paper,  large funded pension plans are  conspicuous by  their absence  in  all these
countries (as well as in all other Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics).  Second, even
in countries that have long had funded pension plans and where pension funds have long become major
institutional investors, their role in corporate governance has been renowned for its passivity.  Pension
fund managers have traditionally been expected to vote with company management or sell their shares if
they were unhappy with their performance.  It is only in recent years that pension funds have started to
be forcefully involved in corporate affairs.  But there is considerable uncertainty about the direction, form
and impact of their involvement and there are also many unresolved policy and regulatory issues.
The  most  pressing  and  challenging  task  facing  transitional  economies  today  is  enterprise
restructuring.  Clearly, or perhaps hopefully, the major part of the first phase of such restructuring will
have been completed  before pension funds can become large enough to deserve to  play a part  in the
process.  Thus, in the short to medium term the burden of enterprise restructuring and the leading role in
corporate governance is likely to fall on the state, the banks, the investment funds, the managers and the
workers (and in some cases foreign companies and individual investors) who are likely to be the major
owners of large corporations.
The social security and pension systems of all four countries are in deep trouble and  in need of
fundamental reform.  This reform  should involve the  restructuring and  downsizing of public pension
systems and the establishment of supplementary private pension funds.  But even if pension reform were
to be implemented immediately, pension funds commanding large financial resources and therefore able
to become substantial company shareholders would take several years to develop.  Large pension funds
with a key role in enterprise restructuring and corporate governance would emerge in the immediate future
only in the unlikely event of a massive transfer of equity stakes in privatized enterprises to newly created
pension  funds.  Such  a  transfer  would  be  inadvisable given the  lack of  financial  expertise  and  the
weakness of capital market institutions, but it appears to be discussed in some countries.
Although pension funds are unlikely to play a major part in enterprise restructuring in the short
to medium term, actions that will be taken over the next few years will shape their future role in corporate
governance and will also affect the financial health of both the corporate sector and the pension systems
of each country.  This paper discusses the prospects for pension reform  in these four countries and the
factors  that  could  influence  the behavior  of pension funds  in the  financial system  and  their  role in
corporate governance.The paper is structured as follows.  The remainder of this section summarizes the main findings
and conclusions of the paper.  Section II examines the issues and prospects of pension reform in the four
countries under review.  Section III offers a brief overview of the role of pension funds in capital markets.
Section IV focuses on the factors that determine the role of pension funds in corporate governance and
the recent changes that have been taking place in this area, especially in the US and the UK.  The last
section draws together potential lessons and policy implications for transitional economies.
B.  Main Findings and Conclusions
Public Pensions in Central Europe and Russia. The pension systems of the countries of Eastern
Europe and Central Asia have many features in common.  Perhaps the most  important are both their
growing financial crisis and their inability to provide adequate incomes to most of their pensioners.
The main factor behind these failures is their very high system dependency ratios, caused by low
retirement ages and lax certification of disability pensions.  Combined with near universal coverage, this
has resulted in high levels of pension expenditures as a fraction of national income.  Growing evasion and
arrears are compounding the financial problems of public pension systems, which are saved from financial
insolvency only by the partial indexation of pensions to inflation.  However, in Poland pensions have been
indexed to wages and the pension system is suffering from a large and growing deficit.
The pension systems are unable to maintain the high targeted replacement rates promised by the
schemes, but even so they require high contribution rates.  As a result, the scope for supplementary private
pension funds is currently rather limited.  As the public pension systems are run on a pay-as-you-go basis,
they make no contribution to the accumulation of long-term financial assets.
Supplementary  Non-State  Pension Funds.  The Czech Republic and  Hungary have enacted
legislation that promotes  the creation of supplementary private  pension funds.  These laws favor the
creation of defined contribution schemes, although defined benefit plans are not precluded.  In the Czech
Republic a tax credit is paid by the state, up to a limit of 120 crowns for a 500 crown contribution.  This
credit is used in lieu of tax deductibility of contributions and is therefore a less regressive tax incentive.
In Hungary, the law allows for the tax deductibility of both employer and employee contributions and also
exempts such contributions from social security taxes.  In both Hungary and the Czech Republic the law
provides  for  prudential  controls on  investments to  avoid overconcentration  of risks and  for  adequate
information  disclosure to members.  Some pension funds have been created in these two countries but
their size is still very small.
No private pension laws have been enacted in Poland and Russia, although a draft act has been
prepared in the latter.  Very few pension funds have been created in Poland, but Russia has over 300 non-
state pension funds.  The vast majority of these are little more than savings clubs.  Russian pension funds
operate in a regulatory vacuum, with little standardization in services and products, charges or investment
2practices, but some of these pension funds have the potential to acquire large memberships and become
important institutional investors.
The Role of Pension Funds in Capital Markets.  Large private pension funds are not likely to
emerge and play a big part in the capital market unless the public pension systems of the four countries
are restructured and downsized.  Lower contribution rates will leave greater scope for the development
of private pension funds.
The experience of OECD countries shows that large pension funds that play an important role as
financial intermediaries and institutional investors have emerged over the years only in a small number
of Anglo-American and Continental European countries, where social security pensions have been rather
modest and social security contributions rather low.
Until the creation of nonemployer-based private pension funds in Chile in the early  1980s, most
private  pension  funds  were  employer-based.  They  were  originally  created  to  further  personnel
management  objectives,  such  as  attracting  skilled  workers,  rewarding  loyalty,  and  facilitating  the
retirement  of older,  less productive workers.  Their  role as pension institutions providing  retirement
income insurance evolved  over time  in response to  the rise  of  large corporations  and the  spread of
collective bargaining.
In line with their retirement income insurance function, the majority of private pension funds were
set up as defined benefit plans, but in recent years there has been a clear trend toward defined contribution
plans.  This change has been caused less by outright conversion of plans and more by the underlying
clhange in  industrial structure, especially the decline of  large manufacturing firms  and the growth  of
smaller firms in the service sector.  Tighter regulations on pension funds and the growing instability of
employment  patterns are likely to  increase further the costs of defined  benefit plans and  reduce their
attractiveness for both employers and employees.
Pension funds have accumulated large financial assets (in relation to GNP) in Switzerland and the
Netherlands, where they have a wider coverage than pension funds in Anglo-American countries and they
also offer inflation indexed pensions. But their role as institutional investors in corporate equities has been
limited by their preference for bonds and other debt instruments.
In contrast, pension funds in Anglo-American countries, and especially in South Africa, the UK
and the US, have invested heavily in corporate equities.  But except for  South Africa, pension funds in
Anglo-American countries have tended to acquire small, diversified holdings that have limited their role
in corporate governance.
The  Role of Pension  Funds in  Corporate Governance.  Pension  fund regulations  and  the
incentives facing pension fund managers shaped their passive role in corporate governance.  Traditionally,
3pension funds  were expected to  vote with  management.  They  were constrained  in their criticism of
corporate governance by the threat of retaliation and loss of future business in the case of independent
fund managers and by their accountability to senior corporate executives in the case of self-administered
pension funds.  If they were unhappy with corporate performance, they were supposed to exit by selling
in the market.
Corporate  discipline  was  exerted  by  the  threat  of  hostile  takeovers,  which  have  been  used
extensively over the past 30 years to acquire poorly performing companies.  But hostile takeovers have
also been used to acquire successful firms, strip valuable assets, "greenmail" corporate managements, and
"raid" the surplus assets of company pension schemes.
Antitakeover legislation and more effective corporate defenses have weakened the threat of hostile
takeovers and therefore created a need for other forms of corporate control.  "Exit" by pension funds has
also  become more difficult.  The cost of exit has also increased by the growing domination of equity
markets  by  large  institutional  investors and the  increasing inability  of  pension funds  to  sell without
disrupting the market and suffering big falls in prices.
Use of the exit option has been further restricted by the growing trend toward passive indexation
of equity portfolios, which hinders the disposal of underperforming equities.  These developments have
underscored the importance of exercising "voice" in corporate affairs.
Public pension funds, which are independent of corporate managers, have been less reticent  in
their  criticisms  of  underperforming  companies.  Although  they  are  accountable  to  politicians  and
government bureaucrats and are often subject to political pressures, they have been able to attract public
attention to the power vacuum that has emerged in corporate affairs.  In contrast, private pension funds
have continued to be dependent on corporate managers and to be heavily constrained in their ability to
take individual action against underperforming companies.
Recent Initiatives in Corporate Governance.  New solutions have emerged to fill the power
vacuum in corporate affairs and to increase the accountability of corporate managers:
*  first, existing collective bodies have been encouraged, and new ones have been created, to voice
public  criticism  of  underperforming  corporations,  free  from  the  fear of  retaliation  that  has
inhibited individual pension fund managers;
second, various initiatives have been promoted to strengthen corporate governance structures and
increase the effectiveness of corporate boards in supervising executive managers;
*  third,  specialized agencies have emerged that scrutinize the governance structures and practices
of different corporations and advise pension funds on how to exercise their voting rights; and
4fourth, various specialized monitors of corporate performance have appeared.  Some of these take
nonnegotiated stakes in underperforming companies and adopt aggressive tactics with a view to
changing corporate policy, improving performance and enhancing value.  Others adopt a more
patient approach and acquire friendly stakes that provide support and commitment to incumbent
managers with a view to achieving long-term growth.
Unresolved  Issues.  All these  initiatives have  a  very  recent  origin.  Although  they  were
instrumental  in  changing  the  top  management  of  some  heavily  and  persistently  underperforming
corporations, their long-term impact still remains to be seen.  The risks of excessive concentration  and
abuse  of economic  power  and  of the potential  conflicts of  interest between pension funds  and  their
collective agents on the one hand and other shareholders on the other have yet to be properly addressed.
Moreover,  the  new  approaches  are exposed  to  capture  by  corporate  managers  and  their  long-term
effectiveness has yet to be fully tested.  Finally,  the question of "who monitors the  monitors" and the
creation of appropriate checks and balances remain to be answered.
Lessons and Policy Implications.  Whatever the unresolved policy issues, the above initiatives
represent  a  forceful  response  to  the  power  vacuum  and  lack  of managerial  accountability  that  has
characterized corporate  affairs  in the  US and the  UK following  the rise  of pension  funds and  other
institutional investors.  Whether they are appropriate for the transitional economies of Central Europe and
Russia will depend on the model of corporate govemance and ownership that will be adopted in these
countries.  If pension funds are to play an important role as institutional investors and large holders of
corporate equities, then some or all of the above measures would appear not only appropriate but also very
likely to emerge.
Although radical and fundamental pension reform may not be politically feasible in the short-run
and may  even be inadvisable in the interest of sustaining broad political support  for  privatization and
enterprise restructuring, there  can be little doubt that in the longer run a fundamental  pension reform
would  be  unavoidable.  The  experience  of  more  advanced  OECD  countries  (and  some  innovating
developing  countries)  suggests  that  the  public  pension  system  should  be  restructured,  its  benefits
rationalized, and its size significantly reduced both in order to offer adequate but affordable and therefore
sustainable benefits and in order to leave greater room for the creation and growth of private pension
funds.
Private  pension funds could  be organized  in many  different  ways, but  nonemployer  defined
contribution  plans,  based on  individual capitalization accounts with  full  and  immediate vesting,  full
portability, and full funding, would appear to be preferable in the longer run.  To cope with the need to
achieve a reasonable targeted replacement rate, such schemes could operate with variable contribution
rates, that  are  reset each year  in accordance with  the  salary growth of each worker,  the  cumulative
ilvestment  return on his or her individual capitalization account, and the targeted pension benefit.
5To maximize their modernizing  impact on  securities markets, pension funds should be free to
select their  investments subject to reasonable prudential and diversification norms.  They will be more
effective in exercising "voice" in corporate affairs if they operate within robust structures of corporate
governance  and  exert  their  influence  through  collective  bodies  and  specialized  monitors,  although
experience with this approach is relatively recent and its long-term effectiveness remains to be seen.
11.  THE  PROSPECTS  OF PENSION  REFORM
A,  Public Pensions Systems
Common Features. The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have inherited
social pension systems that have several features in common'.  Perhaps, the most common feature is that
the social pension systems of all these countries are simultaneously faced with a growing financiaPcrisis
and a failure to provide adequate incomes to the vast majority of their pensioners. Other common features
include: a largely monopillar "pay-as-you-go" structure (but with special regimes that benefit privileged
workers); near universal coverage; high levels of expenditure  as a fraction of GDP; very high system
dependency  ratios (caused  by  low retirement ages and  lax certification of  disability  pensions);  high
contribution rates; high targeted but unrealized replacement rates; deficient benefit formulas (including
actuarially  unfair  provisions,  short  assessment periods and  falling  accrual  rates);  imperfect  inflation
indexation; considerable  scope  for  strategic manipulation; limited but growing  evasion;  and growing
arrears.
Demographic Aging.  Attention is frequently drawn to the demographic aging, not only of Central
and Eastern European countries but also of advanced OECD countries, and the problems that this will
create for social security systems.  Yet the financial problem of aging is not current but rather a looming
one thirty or more years from now if no action is taken to avert a financial crisis.  In fact, no country in
the world can today be described as old since nowhere do the old, defined as those over 65, account for
much more than 20% of the total population.  And no country has a demographic old age dependency
ratio (as distinct from a system dependency ratio) that is much higher than 35%.
Progressive demographic aging, caused by  falling birth and death rates and thus an increase in
longevity but without an increase in the normal retirement age, will of course intensify the financial strains
of pension systems.  But demographic aging will affect funded schemes as much as PAYG ones since
what matters more is the proportion of output that will be consumed by retired people and less how this
will be financed (Barr  1992, Vittas 1993b).
Fox (1994) discusses some of these common features.  See also Holzmann (1994).
6System and Demographic Dependency Ratios.  The more pressing problems confronting the
social pension systems of Central and  Eastern European countries stem from faulty  design issues and
structural factors  that are independent of the progressive demographic aging.  All four countries have
much higher system than demographic old age dependency ratios2. In 1992 the system dependency ratios
were 46%  in Russia, 49%  in the Czech Republic and  Poland, and  59% in Hungary.  In contrast, the
respective demographic old age dependency ratios were 31%, 32%, 28% and 36%.  Thus, the gap between
the two ratios was 15% in Russia, 17% in the Czech Republic, 21% in Poland and 23% in Hungary 3.
Table  1
System and Demographic Old Age Dependency Ratios, 1992
SDR  DDR  Gap
Czech Republic  49  32  17
Hungary  59  36  23
Poland  49  28  21
Russia  46  31  15
USA  31  30  1
Switzerland  43  34  9
SDR:  System Dependency Ratio (given by the number of pensioners, including widows, orphans
and disability pensioners, divided by the number of contributors).
DDR:  Demographic Old Age Dependency Ratio (given by the number of people 60 years and
over divided by people aged between 20 and 59 years).
Source:  World Bank Staff Estimates
2  Summary data  on dependency ratios, contribution  and replacement  rates, future  demographic
structures and other aspects of the public pension systems of the four countries reviewed in this paper are
set out in Table 4.
3  It  should be noted that the reported  ratios are estimates and  are not based on  very hard  data
because the pension systems of the four countries have rather weak record systems.  There are also some
conceptual  and  definitional  problems  with  the  data, such as the  proper  treatment  of  survivors'  and
disability  pensions.  Including  widows,  orphans  and  disability  pensioners  in  the  total  number  of
beneficiaries inflates the  system dependency ratio but lowers the average replacement  rate.  A  rise in
unemployment and evasion may also increase the system dependency ratio.  In fact, system dependency
ratios may vary significantly from year to year.
7This high discrepancy between the two ratios is caused by the inclusion of surviving spouses and
orphans among  the beneficiaries, by  early retirement provisions for  selected occupations or industries
(miners, heavy industry, etc.), by special provisions for working women, by lax certification of disability
pensions, by unemployment and by evasion.  Disability pensions accounted for 32% of the total in Poland
and 27% In Hungary.  Poland has a normal retirement age of 65 for  men and 60 for women, yet the
average retirement age is 57.5 years.  Argentina  and other Latin American countries (e.g. Brazil) also
suffer from large discrepancies between their system and demographic dependency ratios.
In some of the more advanced OECD countries, where social security systems are better designed
and less exposed to strategic manipulation, the difference between system and demographic dependency
ratios is much smaller.  T hus, the difference between the two ratios is only  I percentage point in the US
and 9% percentage points in Switzerland.  However, the figures for the demographic dependency ratios
for  the USA  and Switzerland are slightly  misleading because the normal retirement age in these two
countries is higher than 60.  The somewhat high discrepancy in Switzerland is caused by the apparent use
of  disability  pensions as a  way to  tackle unemployment.  Disability pensions represent 27%  of total
pensions, while in the US they are less than  11% of the total.  It should also be noted that Austria and
Germany,  two advanced  OECD countries with quite  large social pension systems, have  a discrepancy
between  system and  demographic dependency ratios that  is closer to that  observed  for  Hungary  and
Poland, though exact figures cannot be easily calculated because of the multitude of programs.
Targeted  and  Average  Replacement  Rates.  The  four  systems  have  very  high  targeted
replacement  rates.  The statutory  rate for  workers who contribute  for the minimum  number of years 4
varied from 50% in the Czech Republic to 55% in Poland and Russia, and 63% in Hungary.  In addition,
the maximum replacement rates for workers with longer contribution periods was 75% in Hungary, Poland
and Russia, and 78% in the Czech Republic.  In practice, however, the average replacement rate, i.e. the
average pension as a percentage of the average wage, was much lower, ranging from 34% in Russia to
49% in the Czech Republic and  Hungary.  Poland had a surprisingly high average replacement rate of
74%5.
The lower average replacement rate is caused by early retirement and dependent pensions as well
as by the failure to index fully pensions to inflation.  In Poland, the high replacement rate is attributed
to the large upward adjustment of pensions effected in 1991 and the subsequent indexation of pensions
4  -25  years for  men and women except for Poland and  Russia where  the minimum contribution
period for women is 20 years.
5  These are nominal replacement rates (i.e., they relate the average pension to the average nominal
wage).  They can be misleading in the same way as nominal contribution rates.  Expressing the average
pension as a percentage of the average net wage (i.e., net of the pension contribution) shows that while
the average net replacement rate remains at 74% in Poland and 34% in Russia, it rises to 52% in Hungary
and 53% in the Czech r.epublic.
8to average wages.  The average replacement rate  is also expected to increase in Hungary in the future,
following  the recent  indexation of  pensions to  (net) wages.  Switzerland and the  US report  average
replacement rates of 27% and 31% respectively.
Nominal and Effective Contribution Rates.  Nominal contribution rates for pensions are also
very high in all four countries.  In 1992 they ranged from 27.2% of nominal wages in the Czech Republic
to 30% in Poland, 30.5% in Hungary and 32.6% in Russia. However, the effective contribution rates were
much lower because the lion's share of contributions was paid by employers.  Employers paid 20.4% of
nominal  wages  in  the  Czech  Republic, 24.5%  in  Hungary,  30%  in  Poland  (i.e.,  100%  of  pension
contributions) and 31.6% in Russia.  In the US and Switzerland, the nominal contribution rates, which are
divided equally between employers and employees, are 12.4% and 9.6% respectively.  In Switzerland, the
federal government and the cantons are jointly contributing 3.3% of payroll for the old age and disability
pensions, while employers  and  employees share equally in contributing  8.4%  of payroll  for  old age
pensions and another 1.2% for disability pensions.  As a matter of policy and system design, 20% of old
age pensions and 50% of disability pensions are financed by the state.
Effective contribution rates, which are obtained by dividing total pension contributions by the
nominal wage augmented by the employers'  contributions, ranged from 23% in the Czech Republic and
Poland to 24% in Hungary and 25% in Russia.  These are very high by international standards.  In the
more advanced OECD countries, effective contribution rates are well below 20%.
Required Contribution Rates and Financial Balance.  Taking into account the system
dependency  ratios and average  replacement  rates,  the required nominal  contribution  rates for break-even
amounted in 1992  to 24% in the Czech  Republic,  29% in Hungary 6, 36% in Poland, and to only 16% in
Russia.  These compare with nominal contribution  rates of 27.2% in the Czech Republic, 30.5% in
Hungary, 30% in Poland and 32.6% in Russia. On the basis of these numbers, the pension systems of
the Czech Republic and Hungary should  be breaking  even (after allowing for administrative  costs and
some evasion),  that of Poland  should  be running  a large deficit,  and that of Russia  should  be accumulating
a large surplus.  The US system is currently accumulating  a surplus that will be used to finance the
pensions  of the "baby boom" generation. The Swiss system  runs a small surplus  but this is wholly due
to the state's contribution.
6  In Hungary,  further  deterioration  in the finances  of the public  pension  system  over the past couple
years  has implied  an increase  in the required  contribution  rate for financial  balance  to 34%. This has been
caused  by an increase  in the system  dependency  ratio to 66% and a rise in the average replacement  rate
to 52%. However,  because  of a fall in the share of covered  wages in GDP (itself caused  by the growing
evasion  that has contributed  to the deteriorating  dependency  ratio), total pension spending has not risen
as a proportion of GDP.  Nevertheless,  the public pension system is now suffering from a growing
financial deficit.
9The financial position of different systems in transitional economies is affected by the growing
problems of evasion and arrears.  Evasion is increasing because of the high contribution rates  and the
growing role of the private sector, especially the emergence of small firms in the service sector.  Arrears
are caused by the financial difficulties confronting many large enterprises, especially in the state sector.
Growing evasion and arrears imply that all four systems are probably suffering fiom  large and growing
deficits.  In fact, the Polish system runs a large deficit amounting to over 6% of GDP, which is a major
drain  on  fiscal  resources.  The deficit of the Hungarian system is hidden  by  opaque accounting and
reporting practices, while the Russian system suffers from a growing failure to collect contributions.
Table 2
Required and Nominal Contribution Rates, 1992
SDR  ARR  RCR  NCR
Czech Republic  49  49  24  27.2
Hungary  59  49  29  30.5
Poland  49  74  36  30
Russia  46  34  16  32.6
USA  31  31  9.6  12.4
Switzerland  43  27  11.6  9.6
SDR:  System Dependency Ratio
ARR:  Average Replacement Rate
RCR:  Required Contribution Rate (for break even)
NCR:  Nominal Contribution Rate
Source:  World Bank Staff Estimates
High Pension Expenditures and Near Universal Coverage.  The financial burden of public
pension systems is exacerbated by their largely mono-pillar structure and near universal coverage 7. These
translate into a  high share of covered wages as a proportion  of GDP and  may  explain why  pension
expenditures correspond  to a  much higher percentage of GDP  in Central and  Eastern Europe  than  is
generally the case in Latin America and other low income countries.  Two of the four countries surveyed
in this paper had in 1992 pension expenditure to GDP ratios of slightly over 10%, Poland reached almost
15%, while Russia had a much  lower level at  5%.  In contrast, most Latin American countries  have
pension expenditures that are well below the 5% level. In Poland, total pension spending rose from 6.9%
7  The coverage of pension systems was historically very high in former socialist economies.  But
growing evasion is cau,;ing a decline in coverage.
10of GDP in 1988 to 14.8% in 1992.  In the US and Switzerland pension spending amounted respectively
to 4.8% and 7.3% of GDP.  It should be noted that pension spending absorbs 14.8% of GDP  in Austria
and  10.8% in Germany.
A comparison between Hungary and Argentina shows that the two countries (prior to the recent
Argentine  reform)  had  broadly similar  system dependency ratios  and average replacement rates,  thus
implying similar required contribution rates for financial equilibrium of their respective systems (Vittas
1993c). The much higher pension expenditure to GDP ratio in Hungary implies that covered wages are
a much higher fraction of GDP  in Hungary than in Argentina.  This is a result of the wider  pension
coverage and perhaps also of the smaller relative  importance of profits and  other nonlabor  income in
Hungary.  Covered wages amounted to 42% of GDP in the Czech Republic, 37% in Hungary, 41% in
Poland, and 29%  in Russia.  In Argentina, the corresponding ratio was estimated at 20% in 1990.  In
Chile, covered wages in the new reformed pension system amounted to 34% of GDP in the same year.
One  consequence of this  feature  is the  potentially much higher transition  cost  of pension reform  in
Hungary and other Eastern European countries.
Table 3
Pension Expenditures, 1992
RCR  CWGDP  PEGDP
Czech Republic  24  42  10.2
Hungary  29  37  10.6
Poland  36  41  14.8
Russia  16  29  4.6
USA  9.6  50  4.8
Switzerland  11.6  63  7.3
RCR:  Required Contribution Rate
CWGDP:  Share of Covered Wages in GDP
PEGDP:  Share of Pension Expenditures in GDP
Source:  World Bank Staff Estimates
Strategic Manipulation and Dispersion of Pensions.  The pension systems of the four countries
also suffer from strategic manipulation and growing dispersion of pensions.  Strategic manipulation is
encouraged by using shorter than lifetime career earnings for determining initial pensions.  In the Czech
Republic pensions are based on the best 5 years of the last 10 years of employment, in Poland on the best
II3 of the last 12, and in Russia on the last 2 years of employment.  In Hungary pensions used to be based
on the best 4 of the last 5 years but they are now based on all years since 1988.
A short assessment period weakens considerably the link between contributions and pensions and
may  give rise to  capricious and even perverse redistributions.  Use of the best few  last years has also
given rise to an increasing dispersion of pensions as a result of the growing decompression of earnings
following the change of economic regime and transition to a market economy.  This development benefits
unfairly high income workers who receive large pensions that bear little relationship to the contributions
that were made when wages were more compressed.
Inflation Indexation.  Failure to index properly to inflation also causes perverse effects, though
such failure acts effectively as a safety valve for the financial viability of these systems.  No  country
appears to have indexed properly the calculation of the reference or base salary for determining initial
pensions, although Hungary is moving toward using indexed career earnings.  In Hungary, earnings since
1988 are now taken  into account and these are indexed to wages up to 2 years before retirement.  A
current proposal considers indexing past earnings up to  1 year before retirement.
The Czech Republic is the only country of the four that does not use indexation for adjusting
pensions in payment.  Hungary used to adjust pensions in payment on an ad hoc basis.  The adjustments
favored  lower  pensions, and thus  partially offset  the effect  on  the dispersion of  initial pensions that
resulted from the decompression of wages.  More recently, Hungary introduced indexation of pensions
to net wages.  This move has put an end to the narrowing of pensions caused by the policy of differential
underindexation but has also exposed the pension system to high future costs.
In Russia, pensions in payment are automatically indexed but because the adjustment is effected
on a quarterly basis and Russia has suffered from prolonged hyperinflation, the real value of pensions is
substantially eroded  before it is restored at the end of each quarter.  Poland has readjusted pensions in
1991 and  has indexed the readjusted pensions to average wages.  This has boosted the real value  of
pensions and has kept them  in line with rising real wages.  Attempts to link pensions to average prices
have met with political resistance and have been put off repeatedly.
B.  The Case for Pension Reform
Although the public pension systems of Eastern European countries are in urgent need of reform,
there does not seem be a strong political appetite for radical and fundamental reform.  Even piecemeal
reform that pushes the system in the right direction, such as gradually raising the normal retirement age,
increasing the assessmentperiod for the calculation of initial pensions, and tightening eligibility conditions
for early  retirement and especially for  disability pensions, is faced with strong political resistance.  A
decision to increase the retirement age of women in Hungary had to be suspended in early  1994.  In fact,
the only measures that h3ve received support and have been implemented have included the automatic or
12ad hoc indexation of pensions to inflation and the use of early retirement to facilitate the restructuring
process.  Both of these measures have caused a sharp deterioration in the finances of the public systems.
In this  context,  a forceful  argument can he  made for  deferring  a fundamental  reform  of the
systems until privatization and other more basic economic reforms are completed.  Under this view, using
the pension system to encourage workers to seek early retirement and thus ease the restructuring process
may make more political sense than making people redundant and paying them unemployment  benefit.
Even though pensioners may continue to work in the informal sector, the same could be true of workers
receiving  unemployment benefit.  The financial cost  of early  retirement and  unemployment  could be
broadly the same for the public budget, but the political cost of redundancy and unemployment could be
much greater and could result in a substantial weakening of electoral support for continuing economic
reform and restructuring.
There can be little doubt, however, that in the longer run radical pension reform  is unavoidable.
Such reform  should encompass both a downsizing of the public system and the creation of fully funded
private pension funds.  The reformed public system should include raising the normal retirement age to
65  or  even  higher  so  as to  lower  substantially  the  system  dependency  ratio  and  also  prevent  the
progressive aging of the population from swamping the system.  It should also include strong safeguards
against strategic manipulation, such as tightening the eligibility conditions for early and disability pensions,
using indexed lifetime career eamings for determining initial pensions, applying linear accrual rates and
providing  for  proportional  pensions for  workers with shorter  careers (and  thus eliminating minimum
contribution periods that tend to penalize workers with less than full careers), lowering target replacement
rates to no more that 40% of average wages and even preferably to no  more than  40% of net average
wages, and lowering contribution rates.
The reformed  public  pension system could  be  based  on  flat  pensions  irrespective  of  career
eamings.  These could be subject to narrow or broad means tests (under a narrow means test only retired
workers with incomes and assets below a certain low level would be eligible for a state pension, while
under a broad means test only retired workers with more than a certain high level of income and wealth
would  be  excluded  - the  broad  means  test  would  be  less  expensive  to  administer,  would  be  less
stigmatizing recipients of state pensions and would avoid subjecting low income retirees to a poverty trap,
but it would have a higher fiscal cost and would thus require higher contribution rates).
Altematively,  the  reformed  public  pension  systems could  be  based  on  a  two-part  structure,
involving a flat minimum pension for every year of contribution and an eamings related component based
on indexed lifetime earnings, with the combined pension being subject to clearly stipulated limits.  Such
a system would be less progressive than a simple flat minimum pension but it would involve a lower fiscal
cost (for  a given total  level of state pensions) and would entail a  fairer  treatment of  middle  income
workers.
13C.  Supplementary Non-State Pension Funds
The choice of structure for the reformed public pension systems will clearly depend  on  local
economic and political conditions.  Whatever the chosen structure, the reformed public pension system
should involve substantially lower contribution rates in order to allow room for the creation and expansion
of private pension funds.  In addition, the successful promotion of private pension funds will require the
enactment  of  enabling  legislation,  the  development  of  a  strong  regulatory  framework,  and  the
modernization of financial markets.  Considerable initiatives are under way in all  four countries.  Two
countries have passed laws authorizing the establishment of private pension funds, while in the other two
pension funds have started to emerge under other acts.
Private  Pension Funds in the Czech Republic.  The Czech Republic  introduced  legislation
permitting the establishment of supplementary pension funds (SPFs) in February 19948. The act became
effective in May 1994.  These funds are set up as joint  stock companies and are clearly separated from
the powerful (voucher)  investment funds (IFs) in the Czech Republic.  Members of the bodies of a SPF
(i.e. management or supervisory board) may not at the same time be members of the bodies of an IF.  The
same restriction applies for persons who are involved in securities trading or members of the custodian
institution that acts as depositary for the securities owned by the funds.  As in Germany, funds can grant
a proxy to the custodian institution -- normally a bank -- to vote their shares.  This could potentially make
banks very powerful in corporate governance.  The regulations are clearly aimed at restricting conflicts
of interest.  Employees of the SPF may not be members of its supervisory board to insure independence
of the latter even though supervisory boards in the Czech Republic are less powerful than for example in
Germany (which also has a two-tier  board system).  Unlike in Germany, the supervisory boards in the
Czech Republic do not elect and dismiss the management board.  Other regulations (such as for example
against self-dealing of SPF-employees) are also intended to limit fraud and conflicts of interest.
The SPFs are required to disclose to participants their general investment strategy  as well as their
economic results by sending them annual statements and by publishing semi-annual results and the results
of their last three business years.  SPFs may invest in securities traded on a public stock exchange.  They
may invest up to 5% of their assets in shares of a single company and may buy up to 20% of an equity
issue (the same limits apply for  investment funds).  SPFs could therefore potentially acquire sizeable
stakes in companies, if not individually, then collectively as institutional investors.  However, SPFs are
required to invest in a 'prudent manner'  and to ensure a 'steady yield'  on their investments.  Whether or
not these regulations will limit the equity investments of SPFs more than the limits mentioned above will
depend on the interpretation of the law.
s  This section is based on an unofficial translation by Arthur Andersen, Prague of the Czech Act
on  Supplementary  Pension  Insurance with  State  Contributions and  Amendments Associated with  its
Introduction.
14The voluntary pension schemes are set up as defined-contribution plans, i.e. the contributions are
defined and the actual pension payments depend on the yield of the pension fund's  portfolio, although
defined  benefit plans may  also be established.  SPFs also administer  life insurance, survivor pensions
("inheritable pension") and  disability pensions.  As their name implies, participation  in the system  is
voluntary.  The government subsidizes the system to some extent.  Depending on the amount a participant
contributes, the government adds up to 40% or 120 crowns, on the basis of a specified declining schedule 9.
Participants can transfer their contributions (with their share of the investment income) to another SPF and
also terminate the contract at any time.  These regulations are very important, could potentially increase
competition among funds and serve as a tool for the participants to exert pressure on the funds to perform
well.  A potential drawback may be high administrative costs, although restricting the possibility to switch
between funds to -- for example -- once a year, could mitigate this problem.  The portability of pensions
is also much  better  in this  system, which  will make labor mobility  easier -- an  important  feature  in
transitional economies with great need for restructuring.
The Czech law on private pension funds contains a number of interesting features.  First,  it is a
voluntary system but uses tax credits (rather than tax exemptions) for encouraging workers to participate.
These amount to 24% for a monthly contribution of 500 crowns.  As 500 crowns is about 8% of average
monthly salary, the system clearly favors low income workers and thus avoids the regressive effect of tax
exemptions.  However, the tax credits do not appear to be dependent on workers contributing a minimum
proportion  (say  10%) of  their  monthly  income.  Thus,  high  income workers  may  subscribe  for  a
contribution  of no more than 500 crowns.  This will hold back the total size of the funds.  Second, the
law allows workers to have one account with one pension fund.  In this it follows the pattern established
in Chile.  The main motivation for this restriction in both countries is to increase the transparency of the
scheme and facilitate cornpliance.  Third, the law allows workers not only to change funds but also to
cancel their contracts and withdraw from the scheme.  The law does not seem to prevent workers from
cashing in the government tax credits together with their own contributions and the investment income
credited to their accounts.  Thus, the funds may help provide relief to unemployed workers.  But again
a large tax expenditure in the form of tax credits may fail to generate funds that would be adequate for
reasonably high supplementary pensions.  So far 4 groups have applied for authorization under the new
law.  These include the Harvard  investment group,  Agrobanka, the Ministry of  Defense, and  a  large
insurance company.
Private Pension Funds in Hungary.  Hungary has introduced an act on voluntary mutual benefit
funds, which came into force in January 1994.  There are three types of funds, namely pension funds,
9  The maximum state contribution is 120 Czech Crowns (KC).  The following schedule applies:
Participant:  State contribution:  Participant:  State contribution:
100-199  40 + 32% of amount above 100  300-399  96 +  16% of amount above 300
200-299  72 + 24% of amount above 200  400-499  112 + 8% of amount above 400
15mutual aid funds and health care funds, which shall supplement the public social security system.  The
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mutual aid funds cover risks such as sickness, child raising, unemployment and death and are organized
on a pay-as-you-go  (PAYG) basis.  The health care funds also operate on  a PAYG basis and  provide
health insurance supplementing the public health care system. Pension funds are organized as fully funded
defined-contribution plans based on individual capitalization accounts, although defined-benefit plans may
also be established.
Funds are to be based on a common employer or on  a professional, sectoral or regional basis.
Membership fees have to be a uniform amount or a certain proportion of income for all fund members.
Employers can also contribute (either in fixed amounts per employee or income-proportionate), in which
case they have  some control rights in the fund.  They have voice, but no voting rights in the general
meeting, but if their contributions are 50% or more of the sum of contributions, they also have voting
rights in the control committee.  Contributions are tax deductible (subject to limits) as is the investment
income of the fund.  Contributions are also free from the very high social security taxes.  Benefits, both
in the forn  of an annuity  and as a lump sum payment, are subject to  income tax.  Contributions  are
collected in individual accounts. The minimum waiting period to withdraw the accumulated contributions
and the investment yield is ten years, unless a member reaches the retirement age earlier.
Every fund member is an owner of the fund and has the right to inspect the books.  The bodies
of the fund are the General Meeting (GM), the Board of Directors (BD) and the Control Committee (CC).
The GM is the supreme decision-making body of the fund and each fund member has one vote.  It meets
at least once a year'" and elects both the BD and the CC.  No employees of the fund may be elected to
the  BD and  neither employees  nor  members of the  BD may  be elected to the  CC.  The  BD  is the
managing body of the fund but may hire a manager for day-to-day activities.  It meets at least once every
three months.  The CC is chosen from among the members of the fund and supervises the activities of
the BD.  A further control institution is the Fund Supervision Agency, which is established by the Ministry
of Finance and is responsible for licensing and supervision of funds.
The fund's  property  is to  be invested in the sole interest of its members and  funds are  only
allowed to invest their own assets to avoid conflicts of interest.  Investments have to be divided among
different formns  to reduce the risk for the fund and its members.  Funds may not acquire more than  10%
of an undertaking  and  may  not invest more than  10% of their own  assets in an enterprise  whicil  is
affiliated with an employer member.  At most 20% of fund assets may be invested with the same issuer
(except  for  government bonds) and  at most 20% of fund deposits may  be held  in the same  finanicial
institution.  At most 20% of fund assets may be invested in shares and bonds quoted on a stock exchanige
and at most  10% may be invested in unlisted shares and bonds, which are not quoted.  Furthermore, at
least 10% of fund assets must be in liquid instruments.  The fund may delegate its asset management to
'°  The CC or  10% of the fund members also have a right to call the GM.
16investor organizations, but not more than 45% of its assets may be with one organization.  Before funds
reach a certain size", they may not invest in securities (other than government bonds and state guaranteed
securities) at all.
What does not appear to be regulated in the law is the transfer of accounts from one pension fund
to  another  and  can therefore  apparently  be restricted  by  the  fund.  The  funds  appear also  to  have
substantial freedom in establishing rules for the termination of membership' 2. The possibility  for fund
members to move their account to another fund might help increase competition among  funds and lack
of regulation could be seen as a serious shortcoming of the new law.
The tax deductibility of contributions and especially their exemption from the very high  social
security taxes provide a strong financial incentive for the creation and growth of private pension funds.
However, because contributions are locked into long-term savings, the funds will be attractive  only to
workers above a certain level of income who can more easily afford to save for the long term.  Their
effect will be highly regressive and will also undermine further the financial position of the public pension
system.  So far there  have been more than 40  applications for  the creation of mostly  employer-based
pension funds.  8 have already been approved at the time of writing this paper, including one for the
employees of MATAV, the Hungarian telecoms, and one for employees of the National Bank of Hungary,
the central bank.
Private Pension Funds in Poland. To date, Poland  has not introduced  regulations  for the private
provision  of  pensions, although  the need  for  a supplementary pension pillar  has been  the subject of
extensive debate" 3. Such a pillar could be mandatory or optional, the former case would support a faster
development  of  supplementary  pensions, the  latter would  be  more  in  line  with  a  market-economy
approach.  Another question is who should oversee the supplementary pension funds.  Traditionally, any
second tier in Poland had been provided by employers in the form of company, sector and occupation-
specific retirement pensions.  Whether this should also be the form of the supplementary pension system
in the future remains the subject of debate.  It  is also still not decided whether tax  incentives should
support the development of an optional system.  And, finally, whether the government should mandate
benefit and/or contribution  levels of an optional system remains an open question.
Despite the lack of specific legislation, a private pension fund under the name the Polish Pension
Fund (PFE) Kapital  Rodzinny  was created  in 1993  under the law for cooperatives  that has been in force
I"  10,  15, and 20 million HUF for pension funds, mutual aid funds and health care funds,
respectively.
12  § 15 (2): "The legal consequences  of the cessation  of membership  as well as the procedures  to be
followed  are to be regulated  in the statutes."
13  This section draws  primarily  from a draft paper by Jean de Fougerolles  (1994).
17for more than ten years.  The operations of the PFE were challenged by both the General Inspectorate of
Banking Supervision of the National Bank of Poland (the central bank) and by the Insurance Department
of the Ministry of  Finance.  The two regulatory agencies claimed  that the PFE  was engaged without
license in banking and insurance activities.  In response to these challenges the PFE restricted its activities.
However, the prosecution authorities were forced to drop their investigations because cooperatives are not
subject to supervision by either agency.  This underscores the need for enacting a proper pension fund
legislation  and  for  clarifying  which  government agency should have responsibility  for  licensing  and
supervising them.
Private Pension Funds in Russia.  Following the Presidential Decree No. 1077 of 16 September
1992, it is estimated that about 300 so-called non-state pension funds have been established in Russia" 4.
Most have been created in 1994 and their number seems to be growing quite rapidly.  They are generally
very small and operate more like savings banks than  long-term pension funds.  There appear, however,
to be some exceptions involving funds that intend to operate as proper pension funds.
A draft law.  has been prepared for the authorization and regulation of nonstate pension funds, but
it is not clear how soon this law will be enacted.  In the meantime, pension funds operate in a regulatory
vacuum, which not only allows their founders to engage in misleading advertising campaigns, but also
leaves  considerable  room  for  variations  in  practice.  The  situation  is  pretty  chaotic  with  little
standardization  in services and  products, charges, or investment practices.  Most  funds are  based  on
defined  contribution  plans with  individual capitalization accounts for  their  members, but  sorw
additional  benefits and are more akin to defined benefit plans.  Some funds also have rules that allow
withdrawals during unemployment spells.  Most funds direct their selling efforts toward employers.  Even
though some funds engage in advertising oriented toward individual workers, the main emphasis is placed
on signing up firms.
The small pension funds invest their assets in bank deposits and promise a guaranteed return to
members that is no less than the rate offered on SBER savings deposits.  Other pension funds diversify
their investments into bonds and some equities and adopt internal rules based on international practice,
with regard to investment diversification, information disclosure and operating commissions.
Membership in most funds is small, rarely exceeding several thousand.  However, some funds (e.g
the fund for electric power workers) have tremendous expansion potential.  Assets are generally also quite
small, mostly less than  I billion rubles (half a million dollars), though one of the funds already has  17
billion rubles.  Most pension funds invest their assets locally, unless their management company has a
foreign currency license in which case they may also invest in overseas assets.
14  This section draws on the findings of a World Bank mission to Russia in July 1994 and interviews
with representatives of several pension funds.
18There is considerable debate regarding the need and scope of regulation and supervision.  Pension
fund promoters urge enactment of a law in order to obtain tax benefits, especially removal of the triple
taxation of pension saving (contributions are not deductible, investment income is taxed and pensions are
taxed).  However, there is little agreement on other possible legal provisions.  Some officials favor the
separation of pension funds and managing companies but others want to allow pension funds to have their
own boards of directors and their own investment management capabilities.  There is also less consensus
regarding the nature of pension schemes, some favoring defined contribution and others defined benefit
plans.  The questions of vesting and portability are not properly addressed, while information disclosure
is supported if it is limited to an annual statement with the right for members to ask for more frequent
statements.
On  investment policies,  some officials  favor diversified  portfolios  based on  the prudent  man
concept, others prefer freedom to invest in the projects and securities of sponsoring companies.  There is
support for the enactment of legislation to clarify the status of pension funds bit  less for the creation of
an inspectorate with supervisory responsibilities. There is concern that any investment regulations imposed
by government will favor inefficient industries and social projects and will use the resources of pension
funds as captive  sources for  financing the  budget deficit.  The concept of maximum  limits to  ensure
diversification,  but no  minimum requirements  (to avoid direction  of funds) is not yet  fully  grasped.
However, some pension funds want to see restrictions on advertising to curb misleading claims.
The regulatory  vacuum  is likely to continue,  even  after the  passing  of a  pension  law.  An
inspectorate for pension funds has been created at the Ministry of Social Protectiort, but it will be a long
time before it is properly staffed and develops an effective system of supervision.  In the meantime, there
may be greater hope in encouraging a process of self-regulation with the association of pension funds
acting as a sponsor of respectable institutions.  This could develop a code of ethical conduct and business
behavior that would encourage the adoption of sound and prudent practices and instill greater confidence
in the pension fund industry.
Despite the problems, pension funds are likely to grow very fast in the future, especially if fiscal
incentives are offered, inflation is brought under control, the privatization program is successful, and the
financial situation of industrial companies improves.  They could play  a big part in the development of
capital markets and in corporate governance.
III.  THE  ROLE  OF PENSION  FUNDS IN THE  CAPITAL  MARKETS
If private pension funds are authorized in Eastern European countries, should they be established
as  defined-benefit,  employer-based  schemes  or  as  defined-contribution,  nonemployer-based  plans?
Whichever form they take, what factors would determine their future growth and their role in the capital
markets?
19The experience of OECD countries and several developing countries suggests that, whatever their
contribution  in the past, defined-benefit,  employer-based schemes are faced with growing  problems of
financial sustainability and  fair treatment and  require for their equitable operation strict  and complex
regulations that will lower their attractiveness for both employers and employees.  Defined contribution
plans based on individual capitalization accounts also require robust regulatory frameworks but are less
affected by sustainability and equity problems.
The experience of OECD countries and several developing countries also suggests that a major
determinant of the size and growth of private pension funds is the size of the public pension systems.
Other factors contributing to pension fund growth are their coverage, the nature of their liabilities, and
their  investment  returns.  Clearly  pension funds can  accumulate substantial financial  resources  in  a
relatively short period of time but their impact on the capital markets will depend on both regulation and
the investment attitudes to risk taking that are likely to emerge.  In many European countries investmenit
traditions  have  been  more powerful  than  binding regulations  in shaping the  investment portfolios  of
pension funds.  The investment policies of pension funds will also have important policy implications for
investment returns,  the  rate  of  national  saving, the  financing  of small  firms and  new  ventures  and
corporate governance.
A.  Pension Funds as Pension Institutions.
Historically, company pension schemes tended to take the form of defined benefit plans. This was
because such schemes were initially conceived as personnel management tools with the triple objective
of attracting skilled workers, rewarding loyalty, and facilitating the retirement of older workers (Hannali
1986, Williamson  1992).  Defined benefit plans  involved restrictions on  vesting  and  portability  that
penalized early leavers and discouraged labor mobility.  Moreover, by basing pensions on final salaries,
they favored management workers (who receive larger salary increases late in their career) against rank
and file workers.  Defined benefit company pension schemes absorbed the investment risk of accumulated
assets, which  also  covered  the  inflation risk prior  to retirement,  and  thus  provided an  insurance for
achieving  a  targeted  replacement  rate at  the time  of  retirement  (Bodie  1990b).  But this  insurance
depended on  a worker staying with the sponsoring company until retirement, while  it failed  to cover
pensions in payment.  The realization of the pension promises made by employers depended heavily on
their integrity and solvency.
To discourage  abuse  of pension schemes by  unscrupulous employers,  various countries  have
enacted  legislation that  stipulates minimum  standards for  vesting and  portability  as well  as for  more
equitable treatment of all types of workers. including early leavers, and for protecting pensioners from the
vagaries of inflation.  These have increased the costs of pension schemes for sponsoring employers amid
have stimulated a trend away from defined benefit and toward defined contribution plans.  The latter have
traditionally been used by smaller firms in industries with more labor mobility and less stable employmenit
patterns.  Defined contribution schemes can deal more effectively with the vesting and portability issues
20but they transfer to workers the investment, replacement and inflation ris,s.  One way to overcome this
problem is to encourage use of variable contribution rates during the active life of workers, linking them
to the investment performance of the funds and the targeted replacement rate, and to use indexed annuities
when workers retire.
Although defined benefit occupational pension schemes have made a considerable contribution to
the  retirement  income  of  a  substantial minority  of  privileged  workers,  the  growing  instability  of
employment patterns, the increasing cost of pension regulations, and the increasing robustness of financial
and insurance markets suggest that the relative disadvantages of defined contribution schemes will decline
further in the future.  The arguments for fully-portable and non-employer-based pensions are even stronger
in Eastern Europe.  The need for substantial restructuring will lead to major changes and large mobility
in the labor market, which will in turn create a need for fully portable pensions. Insolvencies will be quite
common in Eastern Europe for some time to come, rather than occur at the margin as in mature market
economies, and employer-based pensions would have potentially adverse financial effects on displaced
workers.  The clear implication is that reforming Eastern European countries should veer  their private
pension funds toward  defined contribution plans based on individual capitalization accounts and using
variable contribution rates.  At the very least, they should allow workers to opt out of company schemes
and join  non-employment-linked personal pension plans, while any tax benefits should be made equally
available to company and noncompany schemes.
B.  Pension Funds and Asset Accumulation
Relative  Importance of Pension Funds.  The organization of the pension system has become a
major  determinant of differences  in the  institutional structure of national financial  systems.  In those
countries where unfunded social security systems pay generous pensions to retired workers, both funded
pension schemes and to a lesser extent life insurance companies have been slow to develop.  In contrast,
countries where social security pensions have been more modest or where companies have been allowed
to contract out of a major component  of state pension systems (as  is the case  in the UK), employer-
sponsored  funded  pension  schemes have  accumulated  large  financial  savings.  Because  the  pension
schemes of smaller companies are often insured and administered by insurance companies, both pension
funds and  life insurance companies have experienced considerable growth in these countries.  The first
group of countries includes Germany, Austria, France, Italy and, to a lesser extent, Japan.  The second
group comprises all Anglo-American countries (e.g., the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa)  as well as several continental European countries, such as the Netherlands,  Switzerland,
Sweden, Denmark and Norway.
It  is worth noting that, unlike the traditional distinction between bank-based and market-based
systems, the dividing  line between countries with developed and underdeveloped pension  funds (and
insurance companies)  is no  longer a  simple one  between continental  European  and Anglo-American
21countries.  In fact, pension funds in Switzerland and the Netherlands have wider coverage and larger assets
(relative to GNP) than most Anglo-American countries.
Switzerland has long had an employer-based second pillar.  This became mandatory  in  1985,
expanding  coverage among  employees of small firms and  reaching over 90%  of all  workers.  In the
Netherlands, occupational pension schemes are arranged by collective bargaining and are quasi-mandatory,
achieving coverage in excess of 80%.  In contrast, most Anglo-American countries have coverage in the
region of 45 to 60%.  In addition,  Switzerland and the Netherlands effectively offer  inflation indexed
pensions.  Inflation indexing implies higher required funding levels, which may explain why pension fund
assets in these two countries exceed 70% of GNP.  Adding the assets of life insurance companies, which
often  manage  the  pension  schemes of  smaller firms,  brings  the  total  assets  of  contractual  savings
institutions to well over  100% of GNP (Table 5).
Among  Anglo-American  countries, only  the  UK  has  pension fund  and  life  insurance assets
reaching similar levels.  Although coverage is smaller in the UK and inflation-indexed pensions are less
widespread, the total assets of pension funds are large because companies are allowed to contract out of
the state earnings-related  pension system.  This  imposes a  greater liability on  UK company  pension
schemes and thus a greater need for accumulating assets than,  for instance, in the US where company
pensions are generally integrated with social security pensions.
Among  developing  countries, large funded  pension systems exist  in a  few countries,  ;-.  lbly
Singapore,  Malaysia and  Chile, where  they  are  based on  defined  contribution  plans with  individual
capitalization accounts.  The  systems of  Singapore and  Malaysia are  centrally managed  by  national
provident funds, while in Chile the government mandated system is privately managed by decentralized
competitive firms subject to draconian regulations and supervision.  South Africa, Cyprus, Zimbabwe and
to a lesser extent Brazil, India and Indonesia, also have funded pension schemes that are mostly based on
company plans.  There are also some developing countries with partially funded public systems such as
Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and the Philippines'5. In contrast, most countries in Latin America (at least until
the recent wave of pension reform), Eastern Europe, Francophone Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia
have pay-as-you-go social pension systems that make no or  little contribution  to the accumulation of
financial assets.
Determinants of Pension Fund Growth.  The size of pension funds depends on the coverage
of the schemes, their length of existence and maturity, and the nature of their pension liability.  Schemes
that promise  a  pension  based on  final  salary and  indexed to  subsequent inflation  and  have  been  in
operation  for  a  longer time and  thus cover a  more aged  labor  force- will tend  to  have  higher assets
compared to younger  schemes that operate defined contribution plans and cover a younger  labor force.
15  Some publi,  pension systems in OECD countries are partially funded (e.g., Canada, Japan, Sweden
and the US).
22High investment returns also increase the level of assets, although adjustments in contributions may offset
the effect of high returns.
A major determinant of funding private pension plans and thus of the level of assets is also the
tax treatment of pension saving.  In most countries, pension saving benefits from tax deferral, whereby
annual contributions and investment income are exempt from tax but pensions are subject to tax like any
other source of income. If the total income in retirement is less than income during a worker's  active life,
then tax deferral will also result in lower lifetime taxes in a country with a progressive income tax system.
The vast accumulation of pension fund assets has led several countries to put limits on the tax
privileges of pension funds'6. These include limits on contributions and eligible pension benefits (UK),
limits or nondeductibility of contributions in overfunded schemes (US, UK and Germany), taxes on assets
in excess of specified overfunding  levels (Netherlands) and taxes on investment income above a certain
rate of return (Denmark).  New Zealand has gone farther than any other country and has removed all tax
benefits, subjecting pension saving to a full income tax system. There has been a decline in pension fund
assets in New Zealand following this measure, though the fall has been partly caused by the termination
of overfunded and fully funded schemes and not just  by a decline in the annual flow of saving and in
worker participation  in pension schemes.
Accumulation of Assets.  The creation of funded pension schemes can generate substantial long-
term  financial  savings  even  in a  relatively  short  period of time.  In countries  where  labor incomes
represent 50% of national income, pension schemes, based on defined contribution plans, covering 40%
of the labor force and involving an average contribution rate of  10%, would accumulate annually funds
equal to 2% of national income.  If the nominal rate of return on fund assets is equal to the nominal rate
of growth of GNP, and since in the early years of pension funds outlays would be minimal, these pension
schemes would accumulate resources equal to 10% of GNP over 5 years and 20% over  10 years.  After
the first  10 years, the pace of accumulation will be affected by the growing volume of benefit payments.
On the other hand, expanded coverage, an increase in the share of labor income in total income, a higher
contribution  rate,  or  higher  investment returns will  all  tend  to  accelerate  the  pace of  accumulation.
Defined  benefit plans may accumulate even  larger funds if the sponsors of the plans take account of
projected pension benefits.
The experience of Singapore, Malaysia and, more recently, Chile shows that once a credible and
well run system is put in place, it can accumulate long-term resources at a very fast pace.  In Singapore,
the resources of the Central Provident Fund rose from 28% of GDP in 1976 to 73% in 1986, while in
Malaysia they grew from  18% of GDP in 1980 to 41% in 1987 (Vittas  1992).  In Chile, the system of
16  For details, see Davis 1993.
23personal pension plans that was introduced in 1981 expanded from a mere 1% of GDP in 1981 to 9% in
1985, 26% in 1990 and to over 30% by 1992 (Vittas and Iglesias 1992, World Bank 1994).
In the US,  and especially in the UK, contractual savings experienced a large  expansion in the
1980s in relation to GDP  as a result of the large rise of stockmarket prices.  In the US, the assets of
insurance companies and pension funds grew  from 43% of GDP  in 1970 to 49% in  1980 and 75% in
1990.  In the United Kingdom, they rose from 45% in 1970 to 49% in 1980 and nearly  100% in 1988
(Davis 1993, Vittas 1992, World Bank 1994).  The much faster rise in the United Kingdom reflects the
greater exposure of contractual savings to the equity market and the stronger performance of life insurance
policies.  Similar increases in the total assets of pension funds and life  insurance companies  were also
observed  in Switzerland  and  the Netherlands although  in  these cases the  increase  reflected  more  an
expansion of coverage and  less an increase in the value of assets.  This is because pensions funds and
insurance companies in these two countries invested a much smaller percentage of their assets in equities
and real estate (see below).
C.  Impact on Securities Markets
Financial Innovation and Modernization.  With the accumulation of large financial resources,
pension funds can play a very big part in the financial system and especially in the securities markets of
different countries.  Since they have long-term liabilities they are able to invest in long-term assets.  As
they  do  not  normally  have  expertise  for  appraising  individual  projects  and  requests  for  finance by
individual firms, they either rely on commercial banks for investing their funds (e.g., by placing them in
bank  deposits) or,  seeking a  higher return than  is obtainable on  bank deposits, they  invest directly  in
marketable securities, ranging from  government and mortgage bonds to  corporate bonds and equities.
Pension funds may thus provide a large pool of investable resources that can stimulate the development
of securities markets and can also encourage financial innovation.  In the US, it is claimed that many of
the financial innovations of the  1970s and  1980s were in direct response to the needs of pension funds
(Bodie  1990a).
Pension  funds,  in conjunction  with  other  institutional  investors,  can  act  as catalysts  for  the
modernization  of securities markets, the development of efficient  trading and  settlement systems, the
adoption of modern accounting and auditing standards, and the promotion of information disclosure.  But
the actual impact on capital markets depends on the behavior of institutions.  It is a potential effect that
is less likely to happen if institutions hold strategic holdings and trade less and if they are less interested
in protecting minority shareholders.
A traditional argument against fully funded pension schemes was concern that in the absence of
active securities markets, accumulated funds might be used as captive sources for  funding government
deficits, or if they were free to invest in nongovemment securities, they  would invest in speculative or
24unsafe assets.  For instance, funds could be channelled into overpriced real estate or into loans to related
parties and equity stakes in related firms.
This argument was probably valid in the  1960s and  1970s when few developing countries had
organized securities markets.  But in the 1980s the large growth of the emerging securities markets shows
that most countries have the potential to stimulate the development and modernization of their securities
markets  if they adopt sound macroeconomic policies, maintain financial stability, and remove obstacles
that inhibit the development of markets.  Even though most emerging markets suffer from structural and
regulatory deficiencies, progress is being made in tackling these deficiencies and in creating more robust
and transparent markets.  In fact, the traditional argument against funded pension schemes overlooked the
dynamic  interaction that would evolve between growing pension funds and emerging financial markets
and thus underestimated the contribution that pension funds and other institutional investors could make
to the development of financial markets.
Asset  Allocation.  The allocation of pension fund assets varies considerably from country  to
country, reflecting both historical traditions and differences in regulation.  In the United Kingdom, where
fund managers have developed an equity cult since the 1960s, mainly in response to the high rates of
inflation experienced by the UK economy over the past 30 years or so, pension funds and life insurance
companies accounted in 1988 for 55% of corporate equities.  In contrast, in the United States they held
only 26% of corporate equities.  However, American long-term institutional investors also held  56% of
corporate bonds.
The equity cult of UK fund managers is also reflected in the composition of their portfolios.  UK
pension funds  invested 72% of their assets in equities and other real assets against 46% for  their US
counterparts  (Table  6).  The difference  is much greater  for  life  insurance companies: UK companies
invested 51% of their assets in equities against less than  10% for US companies.
In continental European countries, contractual savings institutions follow the pattern of American
life insurance companies and place the largest part of their funds in government, corporate and mortgage
bonds and in long-term loans.  This is true of insurance companies and pension funds in Switzerland, the
Netherlands and  Germany.  It  is partly the result of investment regulations and  partly the result  of a
traditional  emphasis  on  conservative  investment  policies.  Although  pension  funds  and  insurance
companies are subject to upper limits on their holdings of equities (as well as on their holdings of overseas
securities) and  although their managers are seeking either  increases in these  limits or their  complete
abolition, their holdings of restricted investments are well below the specified limits.
The pattern in developing countries is similar to that of continental European countries.  Except
for South Africa, where pension funds and life insurance companies have been free to invest in equities,
in most other countries investment rules have favored bonds.  In Singapore, the Central Provident Fund
invests over 90% of its funds in government securities that earn a  modest positive real rate of return.
25Despite the enforced captivity of its resources, the government of Singapore has refrained from investing
all the funds in local development projects but has accumulated a  substantial pool of foreign exchange
reserves, that has grown over time to exceed the total balances of the CPF.  Thus, the CPF effectively
operates as a compulsory national mutual fund, investing indirectly through the Government of Singapore
Investment Corporation and the Monetary Authority of Singapore in foreign assets (including equities and
direct investments in large mining and other projects) on behalf of Singaporean households.
In Malaysia, the funds of the national provident fund have been used for development purposes.
However, the successful implementation of economic growth policies has ensured a modest real rate of
return on the balances of the Employees Provident Fund.  Other countries were not so efficient.  In Egypt,
a  country  where  the  social  security  system generates  large  surpluses (in  1988 accumulated  reserves
amounted to 40% of GNP), these resources have been placed with the National  Investment Bank,  the
investments of  which  have  suffered  from  highly  negative returns.  The  provident  funds  in  African
countries (Ghana, Nigeria,  Kenya and Zambia) and nearly all the partially  funded pension systems of
developing  countries  have  invested their resources  almost exclusively in  government  bonds and  low
interest loans to members.  Real returns on  accumulated funds have been highly negative and in some
cases the real value of balances has been completely wiped out.
In Chile, investments in corporate equities for the privately managed pension funds were less than
20% of total assets for most of the  1980s, mainly because of the imposition of tight restrictions on their
investment portfolios.  As  a  result, the pension  funds were  forced to  invest heavily  in government,
mortgage and corporate bonds as well as bank deposits.  The gradual relaxation of investment rules has
allowed the Chilean pension funds to invest more in equities.  More recently, they were also allowed to
invest in foreign securities.
Investments  in foreign  assets have also been affected  by regulations,  either  foreign  exchange
controls or unnecessarily tight prudential controls.  Following the removal of exchange controls and the
relaxation  of investment rules, pension funds in several countries have built up substantial holdings  of
foreign equities and bonds.  These range from 55% for the typical pension fund in Hong Kong to 26%
in the UK,  25% in Australia, 23%  in New  Zealand, 22% in the Netherlands,  17% in Japan,  13% in
Canada and  11% in the US (Wyatt  1993).  International diversification may increase portfolio returns,
especially  if pension fund assets become too big for the  local markets, but a  more general result  is a
reduction  in  investment risk,  stemming from  the  less than  perfect  covariance  of returns  in different
national markets.
D.  Implications of Investment Policies
The  investment policies pursued  by  pension funds  and  life  insurance companies  in different
countries have important implications for (i) the profitability of their investments, (ii) the required rate of
26contribution and thus the rate of national saving, (iii) the financing of small firms and new ventures, (iv)
fund management practices, and (v) the role of pension funds in corporate governance.
Profitability and Real Rates of Return.  A study (Davis 1993) simulating pension fund returns
on the basis of asset allocations and annual asset returns for nine industrial countries over the period 1966-
90  shows that  average  real  returns  varied  from  5.8%  in the  UK  to  0.2%  in  Sweden.  Somewhat
surprisingly, pension funds in Germany (5.1 %), the Netherlands (4%), Japan (4%) and Denmark (3.6%)
showed higher returns than US funds (2%)'7. Among the nine countries, only Canada (1.6%), Switzerland
(1.5%) and Sweden earned lower returns (Table 7).
UK pension funds invest a higher proportion of their assets in equities and real property.  This
results in higher overall returns but also in higher risk.  UK funds also have one of the highest standard
deviations of return.  It is interesting that German and Dutch funds earn relatively high real returns despite
focusing on bonds and loans.  The explanation for this is the policy of high real interest rates pursued in
these two countries by their respective central banks.  In contrast, Swiss funds with a broadly  similar
allocation of assets earn much lower real returns.  Again, this seems to reflect the low real interest rate
policy of the Swiss authorities, a policy that is motivated by concern about keeping both the nominal and
real mortgage rate low and stable.
Among  developing  countries, most pension funds (especially  the provident  funds  in  African
countries and the partially funded public pension systems of the Middle East and Latin America) suffered
from negative real rates  of return.  During the  1980s the average yearly  real return for  the Zambian
provident fund was minus 25%, while in Egypt the extensively funded social security  system suffered
from a minus 12% real return (World Bank 1994). The main exceptions to this pattern among developing
countries were the provident funds of Malaysia and Singapore, where positive real returns between 3%
and 5% were achieved (Vittas 1993a), and the decentralized private pension funds in Chile, which realized
unusually high returns amounting to over  13% on  assets before operating expenses and to 9.5%  after
deducting expenses".
The extremely high performance of the Chilean pension funds stemmed less from their investments
in equities, which as noted above were highly restricted, and more from two unusual factors that prevailed
during the 1980s in the Chilean economy.  These were the very high level of real interest rates following
'7  The reported returns are sensitive to the base and end year chosen.  For instance, eliminating the
1967-70 period when US pension funds earned negative returns would raise their average real return for
the period 1971-90 to 4%.
I8  Operating expenses were unusually high in the early years of operation of the system.  They have
declined steadily and now amount to less than 2% of total assets (Vittas and Iglesias 1991, World Bank
1994).
27the severe financial crisis of the early  1980s and the subsequent large capital gains earned on bonds and
other debt instruments that resulted from the large fall in the level of real interest rates when the economy
recovered and financial confidence was restored.  In the  1990s the Chilean pension funds are likely to
benefit from high returns in their equity investments, but in the long run it is very doubtful that they will
be able to continue to achieve real returns in excess of 10%.
Impact on the Rate of Saving.  The low real investment returns achieved by the Swiss and the
Singaporean pension funds imply a high required rate of contribution and thus a high level of pension
saving in order to achieve targeted replacement rates.  Comparing the real returns and real wage growth
in the UK and in Switzerland shows that a  10% contribution rate over a 40-year working life in the UK
would pay a 66% inflation-indexed pension over a 20-year retirement life, while a similar scheme would
only pay a 22% pension in Switzerland (Davis 1993, Vittas 1993b).  To achieve the same target pension
rate the Swiss contrikuticn rate would have to be three times as high or 30%.  The high rate of saving,
which characterizes the Swiss economy in conjunction with the low real rate of return, may at first sight
appear economically inefficient.  Yet it may well lie behind the high investment rate and the ability of the
Swiss economy to operate persistently with both low inflation and low unemployment and with a steady
rate of economic growt'1.  Singapore is a high growth economy and this by itself may explain the high
rate of saving. Nevertheless, the low returns on provident fund balances and the high rate of forced saving
may also contribute to the unusually and persistently high rate of national saving of over 45% of GNP.
The Swiss a,1d Singaporean experience may help explain an apparent paradox in the connection
between funded pension schemes and saving rates.  In principle, funding pensions ought to  increase the
rate of saving, but in practice, except for Switzerland, Singapore and Malaysia, most countries with funded
pension schemes, from the US and Canada to the UK and the Scandinavian countries and all the way to
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, are characterized by low saving rates.  One possible explanation
for this is the greater access to household debt available in all these countries, which allows consumers
to offset some of the mandatory or nondiscretionary saving effected through pension funds.  But another
factor may  be the higher rates of return achieved by  pension funds compared to the  rates earned by
individual savers in these countries.  Given a target pension rate, this would imply a lower required rate
of saving.  When pension fund returns are high and funds become overfunded, sponsoring companies
lower their annual contributions or may even take contribution holidays.
Implications  for Small Firm  Finance.  The growth of pension funds and  other institutional
investors may, however, have unidesirable  implications for the financing of small firms and new ventures.
This is because pension funds minimize their transaction costs by dealing in the more liquid securities of
large companies.  Moreover, pension funds have ,difficulty  researching firrns without track record and lack
expertise  in supplyinig venture  capital, wvhile  they also  face prudential  limits on  the  proportion  of a
company's equity they can hold.  One solution for this problem is for pension funds to invest in venture
capital companies and in mutual funds that specialize in small capitalization companies.
28Fund Management Practice.  Most studies for the UK and the US show that active investment
management consistently underperforms market indices.  Lakonishok et al (1992) show that the equity
component of US pension funds underperformed the S&P 500 index by an average of 1.3% per annum
over  1983-89 or by 2.6% if returns are value weighted.  For the UK, Davis (1993) shows that pension
funds underperform their home market, but underperformance is particularly severe in foreign markets.
Such underperformance may justify  a passive policy of investing in the market index, although passive
indexation of investment portfolios might weaken the influence of markets on cbrporate performance and
might require a greater and more direct involvement in corporate governance issues.
Implications for Corporate Governance.  Finally,  regarding corporate governance, it is clear
that in those countries where pension funds invest mostly in bonds and other debt instruments, their role
in corporate governance would be limited to creditor involvement when firms face financial difficulties
and are unable to meet the repayment conditions and other covenants of bond issues.  In several of these
countries  (especially  Germany  and  Japan,  and  to  lesser  extent  the  Netherlands  and  Switzerland)
commercial banks play an important role in corporate governance through varying combinations of stock
ownership, exercise of proxy votes, and board representation".  Insurance companies may also play an
active part through limited stock ownership and board representation, but pension funds are rather passive
observers.  This status is reinforced in those countries (e.g., Germany and to a lesser and declining extent
Japan) where pension fund assets are reinvested in the sponsoring company in the form of book reserves.
In Anglo-American countries where pension funds tend to invest more heavily in equities, they
can play a potentially influential part in corporate governance. However, except for South Africa, the role
of pension funds has historically been passive, although recent trends  indicate a changed attitude and a
more activist approach by pension funds.  In South Africa, pension funds and especially the insurance
companies  that  manage most  of  these funds  and  other  contractual  savings "play a  dominant  role  in
corporate  governance  and  have  controlling  stakes in  a  large  number  of  companies,  including  other
financial institutions, such as commercial banks and even building societies (Gerson 1992, Vittas  1994).
IV.  THE  ROLE  OF PENSION  FUNDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
If pension funds were to become large institutional investors in Easferri European countries, what
factors  would determnine  their  role in corporate governance?  The experience of countries with  large
pension funds suggests that their investment policies would be a major factor.  Investing  in bonds and
other debt instruments would clearly limit their role in corporate governance to that of passive creditors
who are  involved in corporate control issues only when firms face financial difficulties.  Investing  in
equities would offer greater potential, especially if strategic stakes were acquired.  But if pension funds
were to acquire small, diversified holdings, then their direct role in corporate governance would be limited
1  9  The role of banks in corporate governance and  its relevance for Easiern  European countries is
discussed in Gray and Hansoti (1993).
29by the free riding and collective choice problems associated with small holdings and dispersed ownership.
The recent experience of the US and UK markets suggests that considerable reliance could then be placed
on  public criticism and collective bodies (to overcome the disincentives against active involvement of
individual pension funds),  initiatives to strengthen corporate governance structures, and development of
specialized monitors.
A.  Historical Evolution
Range of Experience.  The role of pension funds (and other institutional investors) in corporate
governance differs considerably from country to country.  Four types of experiences can be identified.
First, there are those countries where pension funds (and other institutional investors) are underdeveloped
and thus play a limited role in their financial systems.  In these countries, banks may be more heavily
involved in both corporate finance and corporate governance (as is the case in Germany and Japan) or
industrial and commercial companies may  be owned and controlled  by dominant family groups  (as  is
generally the case in Latin America and East Asia) or by the state (as is largely the case in Africa, the
Arab world and the former socialist countries).
The second group includes those countries where pension funds have become large and control
substantial financial resources  but tend  to  invest in  government and  corporate  bonds and  other  debt
instruments.  This  group  includes  Switzerland,  the  Netherlands  and  the  Scandinavian  countries  in
continental  Europe  as well  as  several  developing  countries  with  funded  pension  schemes,  such  as
Singapore, Malaysia and even Chile 20. In these countries, pensions funds act as passive creditors and are
involved in corporate governance issues only when firms face financial difficulties.  But even then, they
play a passive role and follow the lead set by the commercial and investment banks in organizing rescue
and restructuring operations or  in liquidating firms.  When pension funds invest mostly  in governmeit
bonds (as  is  the  case  in Singapore  and  Malaysia),  their  role  in  corporate  governance  is obviously
nonexistent.
The third group generally includes Anglo-American countries with the notable exception of Soutil
Africa.  In these countries, pension funds have small, diversified equity holdings  in a large number of
companies, while banks and other financial institutions have been discouraged, either by regulation or by
tradition, from acquiring large controlling stakes in nonfinancial corporations.  Ownerslip  of corporations
has become diffuse and corporate control has rested with internal managers, often supported by external
directors hand-picked by chief executive officers.  Institutional investors have traditionally operated as
active portfolio investors but passive shareholders and have relied on the threat of takeover for disciplinilg
corporate management.
20  The role of the Chilean pension funds is likely to change over time as their holdings of corporate
equities increase.  But until now, their equity holdings have been large only in the case of the privatized
utilities and their role in corporate governance has effectively been confined only to such companies.
30The fourth group consists of South Africa.  South Africa provides an interesting paradox in that
the structure of its financial system appears to fit the Anglo-American model (where securities markets
play  a  relatively  greater  role  in  corporate  finance  than  banking  institutions  and  corporations  are
characterized by diffuse ownership and internal control by management), while its system of corporate
governance  seems  to  be  closer  to  what  may  be  called  the  Euro-Asian  model  (where  banks  have
traditionally played a more central role in corporate finance than securities markets and corporations are
characterized by more concentrated ownership and stronger external control on management) 21. One of
the more interesting features of South African finance is the  large role played by  contractual  savings
institutions in corporate governance.  The four largest insurance companies, two of which (Old Mutual
and Sanlam) are mutual and two (Liberty and Southern) are joint stock companies, own  large stakes in
numerous industrial and commercial companies as well as controlling stakes in the major South African
banks (Vittas  1994).
Impact of Regulation and Tradition.  As in the case of their portfolio investments, the different
roles  of  pension  funds  in  corporate  governance  reflect  both  historical  traditions  and  differences  in
regulation.  Outside South Africa, the pattern of corporate governance in Anglo-American systems has its
roots  in the  fear of excessive concentration of economic  and financial  power in the  hands  of a  few
institutions and groups.  In the US, pension funds have been discouraged from acquiring large  equity
holdings  by  the  "prudent  man"  rule that  has emphasized  both  diversification  and  compliance  with
prevailing practice, while commercial banks, insurance companies and mutual funds have been prevented
from acquiring large, controlling stakes in nonfinancial corporations by government regulations (Roe 1990
and 1991).
In the UK, tradition has exerted a more important influence than regulation.  Although commercial
banks have not been subject to prescriptive regulations, they  have focused their  lending operations on
short-term, self-liquidating loans rather than on long-term loans and equity stakes (Kennedy 1987).  This
policy has enjoyed the tacit support of the authorities and has also been reflected in the "prudent man"
rule regulations imposed on insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds.  But UK institutional
investors  have  been  more  openly  critical  of  corporate  policies,  not  only  when  corporations  are
underperforming but also when they adopt low dividend payouts or award excessive remuneration to their
senior managers.
The emphasis on small, diversified holdings has forced pension funds in the US and the UK to
play a passive role in corporate governance.  Small holdings and dispersed ownership  have created a
collective choice problem since investors have little incentive to incur the high costs of monitoring and
are prone  to  "free ride" on  the monitoring  efforts  of others.  In addition,  the fiduciary  emphasis  on
21  This combination may have several advantages over the pure Anglo-American and Euro-Asian
models, such as greater reliance on equity finance but with more effective monitoring of corporations than
has been customary in the US or UK markets (Gerson 1992).
31compliance with prevailing practice has implied that no pension fund could deviate significantly  from
established practice unless such deviation was clearly perceived as beneficial to pension fund members
and was not undermining the fiduciary standards of pension fund managers (Roe 1993).
Until the recent decline of the "exit" option, an important tradeoff between liquidity and control
had emerged in the US and the UK (Coffee 1991).  Pension funds and other institutional investors valued
liquidity and their ability to exit from an underperforming company at low cost.  Control implied a decline
in  liquidity and  incurrence of potentially large costs  in terms of monitoring  and  bail-outs, while the
potential benefits from greater control were shared by all shareholders 22. It is worth noting, however, that
whereas a combination of both liquidity and control seemed difficult to attain, a situation where pension
funds had neither liquidity nor control was gradually emerging.  The recent initiatives that are discussed
below are a  response to this combination  of lack of liquidity,  lack of control and  lack of managerial
accountability.
In contrast to the US and the UK, regulation and tradition have encouraged the acquisition of
strategic holdings in South Africa.  Such stakes have implied greater control but at the expense of reduced
liquidity for their holders.  In the case of Sanlam (one of the two mutual insurance groups) the strategic
holdings, which generally involve investments in excess of 20% of the capital of the investee company,
have resulted from the traditional policy objective of encouraging the development of Afrikaner industry.
In the mid-1980s, Sanlam set up a special holding company, Sankorp, to monitor actively the performance
of  its strategic holdings.  Old Mutual has adopted a  more passive stance, but claims that its strategic
holdings  broadly  earn  the same  kind of  returns as its portfolio  holdings.  The joint  stock insurance
companies own fewer strategic holdings and their investment policies follow more closely the less active
patterns  prevailing  in the  UK and  other  Anglo-American companies.  Independent self-administered
pension funds, although collectively larger than the insurance companies, are individually smaller than the
big insurance groups and follow their lead in investing in the equities of listed corporations.
The role of the two mutual insurance groups is overshadowed in South Africa only by the greater
involvement  in corporate governance of nonfinancial conglomerates, such as the Anglo-American, De
Beers and Rembrandt groups.  These mainly originate from the mining sector and have acquired  their
extensive interests in industrial and commercial companies in the process of diversification and as a result
of the government policies pursued over the past forty years or so.  It is estimated that, together with the
two insurance groups, foir  oi five South African conglomerates are in direct or indirect, but effective,
control  of 80%  of corporate  assets.  This very  high concentration  of corporate  ownership  has  been
22  Black (1992a) points out, however, that large institutions do make investments in illiquid assets
(e.g., in real estate  and venture  capital), While their liquidity needs may be met by the inflow of new
money.  Thus,  if  allowed by  legal rules, large institutions could prefer choice  over  liquidity.  Black
attributes the limited "voice" exercised by institutional investors in corporate affairs to legal obstacles and
promanager conflicts (see below).
32bolstered by the imposition of tight exchange controls that has prevented investment in overseas securities.
It has also been caused by the purchase by these groups of the stakes of departing foreign investors during
the period of international economic sanctions.
Historical Context.  It is sometimes argued that private pension funds in the US and the UK have
been captured by corporate managers.  The argument is that as pension fund managers are appointed by
senior corporate executives, they are not expected to monitor closely the performance of other corporations
since that would invite retaliation and monitoring of their own operations by the pension funds of other
companies.  Although there is considerable validity in this argument, the basic premise that pension funds
have been captured  by corporate managers is misleading.  This is because it disregards the historical
evolution of pension funds.  Company pension schemes were created by corporations  and were never
independent of company management.  If anything, their evolution over time suggests a gradual but steady
decline in their dependence on corporate management priorities.
As  already  noted  above,  company  pension  schemes  were  historically  created  as  personnel
management tools to attract skilled workers, reward loyalty and facilitate the retirement of older workers.
They imposed onerous vesting and portability restrictions on their members and they were designed so
that few workers would qualify for a pension.  Their cost was therefore intended to be small and could
be easily absorbed from current revenues without any need to fund pension liabilities in advance.  There
was therefore little, if any, funding.  Over time, the rise of large companies in conjunction with the rise
of trade unionism and collective bargaining led to a gradual but substantial increase in the coverage of
pension schemes and to a relaxation of vesting and portability restrictions, although the schemes were still
biased toward rewarding workers with long tenure (Hannah  1986).
This change gave rise to the need for  funding and also increased the cost of pension schemes.
Tax incentives encouraged the setting of provisions against future pension liabilities, but early funding
took  the  form  of  book  reserves,  i.e.  reinvesting pension provisions  in  the  assets of  the  sponsoring
companies, a practice that is still prevalent in Germany and other countries.  The widespread use of book
reserves limited the role of pension funds as financial intermediaries and  institutional investors.  Their
personnel management function and their role as pension institutions continued to predominate.
The big change in the role of pension funds as institutional investors occurred in the 1950s when
large US corporations started to invest their growing pension reserves in other comnpanies.  To protect their
sponsoring corporations from anti-trust actions, pension fund managers acquired small, diversified holdings
that  precluded  the  exercise  of  corporate  control  and  also  promoted  the  safety  and  soundness  of
accumulated  reserves.  Since their assets  were small,  pension funds  acquired  small  stakes  in  liquid
securities and adopted  a  "hands-off'  approach in corporate  management.  If they  were unhappy with
corporate performance, they could sell without suffering a big fall in market price.
33Gradual Transformation into Shareholder Activism.  But continuing growth in membership
and growing pressures to protect the long-term interests of workers led to gradual relaxation of vesting
and portability restrictions and to rapid accumulation of reserves to ensure adequate funding of pension
liabilities.  As pension funds (and other institutional investors) became collectively dominant shareholders
of nonfinancial  corporations 23,  they could  no longer exercise the "exit" option without disrupting  the
market and suffering big falls in market prices.  Recent attempts to develop effective means for exercising
"voice" in corporate affairs are a response to the decline of the "exit" option.
In addition,  pension fund managers have been adopting investment policies based  on passive
indexation as an effective strategy for achieving diversification with market returns and low transaction
costs.  Passive indexation policies have limited, however, their ability to divest from poorly performing
companies and have increased pressures for more effective monitoring of corporate performance and for
increasing the  accountability of corporate  managers.  For  instance, the California  Public Employees
Retirement  System  (CALPERS)  -- a largely  passively  indexed  pension  fund  -- analyzes  companies  in its
indexed portfolio and targets poorly performing companies for action, including direct negotiations with
management, withholding votes from directors, or mobilizing shareholder proposals to improve corporate
accountability.  Especially a pension fund with a large portfolio (like CALPERS) would have an incentive
to target  the companies with the poorest management practices and performance.  Even if the cost of
activism outweighs the benefits from improving the performance of one targeted company, the threat of
becoming the  next target  will generate an external discipline on  managers of other  companies  in the
portfolio to improve their performance.
The growing involvement of US and UK pension funds in corporate affairs has also been bolstered
by the decline in hostile takeovers and tender offers, following the excesses of the 1980s and the defenses
adopted by corporate managers.  Hostile takeovers, based on tender offers and proxy contests, have been
extensively used since the late 1950s to acquire poorly perfonliling  comilpaniies,  replace managers, dispose
surplus capacity, and make more efficient use of corporate asset  :.  3u3li  hostile bids have also been used
to  acquire  successful firms  by  large  conglomerates engaging  in  ciimpire-building  and  searchinig for
synergies and  scope economies,  often  in unrelated  markets.  In thc  1980s, hostile takeovers throughi
leveraged buy-outs have been used for breaking up large conglomerates and restructuring individual uniits
but they have also been used for stripping valuable assets, for blackmailing corporate managements into
paying huge ransoms to corporate raiders ("greenmailing"), and even for "raiding" the surplus assets of
company pension schemes.
23  Among large US corporations, institutional investors owned in 1988 86% of the equity of Amoco,
82% of General  Motors, 74% of  Mobil Corp., 71% of  Eli Lilly & Co., and 70% of Citicorp (Coffee
1991).
34Evidence  on systematic  shortfalls in corporate performance  in the US and on the potential
influence  of monitoring  by large  shareholders  is presented  in Black  (I992b) 24. Black  summarizes  evidence
on deficiencies:  in the functioning  of corporate  boards; in corporate diversification  strategies;  in value-
reducing  takeover  decisions;  in management-entrenching  governance  structures;  in corporate  cash  retention
and squandering;  and in excessive  managerial  compensation. He highlights  evidence  that shows: that
independent  directors do a better job than other directors  in firing poorly performing  managers  and in
discouraging bad acquisitions;  that conglomerates  are on average less efficient than more focused
companies;  that manager-controlled  firms are more likely to diversify; that many takeovers  cause the
bidder,  or the bidder  and target  together,  to lose  value; that bidders  with low efficiency  and high cash flow
are more likely to make bad acquisitions;  that combined  bidder and target losses  are greater when low
efficiency bidders acquire high efficiency  targets (in contrast, related takeovers,  takeovers  by well-run
bidders, and takeovers  of poorly performing  targets are more likely to increase  the combined  value of
bidder and target);  that proincumbent  governance  rules reduce stock prices;  that managers  hoard cash and
then spend it  on poor projects; and that managerial compensation  is  excessive and unrelated to
performance.  Black suggests that  institutional investors could add  value by  enhancing director
independence,  discouraging  corporate  diversification,  pressing  bidders  to abandon  suspect  takeover  bids,
pressing  targets  to consent  to value-increasing  bids, insisting  on more efficient governance  rules, making
it harder for managers  to hoard unneeded  cash, and linking  managerial  compensation  to performance.
Anti-takeover  legislation  and more effective corporate defenses have made hostile bids more
difficult  to succeed,  but they  have  also underscored  the power  vacuum  and lack  of accountability  that have
emerged in corporate governance  (Monks and Minow 1991).  Realization  of this power vacuum has
increased pressure on  institutional investors to become more active shareholders.  In  the US, the
Department  of Labor  has urged pension  funds  to exercise  their voting  rights and to treat their proxy  votes
as plan  assets  subject  to fiduciary  standards. Also  regulations  that discouraged  institutional  investors  from
talking to each other have been relaxed.  In the UK, such restrictions did not exist but there was
nevertheless greater pressure on institutional investors to  increase and improve their monitoring of
corporate management.
B.  Recent Initiatives
The past decade  or so has witnessed  a gradual,  but far from complete,  transformation  of pension
funds (and other institutional  investors) from active portfolio investors and passive shareholders  into
passive  investors  and active  shareholders.  The initiatives  that have  been taken  can be classified  into three
types: measures  to exert greater public pressure  on nonperforming  corporate management;  measures  to
24  Monks  and Minow  (1995), in a lucid  and comprehensive  overview  of corporate  governance  issues,
also contain an excellent  discussion  of case  studies  of corporations  in crisis  that includes  the recent travails
of General Motors, American Express, Time Warner, Sears Roebuck & Co, Ammand Hammer and
Occidental  Petroleum,  Polaroid,  Carter Hawley Hale, and Eastman  Kodak.
35ensure better and more robust corporate governance structures; and measures to influence more directly
corporate policy.
Public  Criticism and Collective Action.  The first type  of measures includes greater  public
criticism of misbehaving and  underperforming corporations.  This includes criticism of overambitious
expansion plans  into unrelated areas that smack of empire-building,  low dividend payouts,  excessive
managerial  compensation,  overgenerous compensation for  retiring  or redundant  managers,  and  anti-
takeover defenses that entrench the position of incumbent managers at the expense of shareholders.  Open
public criticism has been instrumental in mobilizing collective action by disgruntled shareholders and in
raising the threat of regulation and legislation to prohibit the alleged abuse and misbehavior.
But public criticism is not always very effective.  First, corporate managers may be able to carry
public opinion with them if they can raise the prospect of job and tax revenue losses for the areas where
their operations are located.  Second, since the managers of private pension funds are effectively beholden
to their chief executive officers, any such public criticism can only come from the managers of public
pension funds, who are more independent of corporate managers (though they are themselves in turn under
the control of politicians).  Even professional fund managers, insurance companies, and mutual funds are
often constrained in their public criticisms by the fear of loss of business from other corporations.
In the US, the leading role in criticizing the managements of underperforming corporations has
been taken by the managers of public pension funds, such as the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CALPERS), the New York State Common Retirement Fund, and other public pension funds in
Wisconsin and other states (Bishop 1994). Insurance companies and mutual fund management companies
have been conspicuous by their silence.  Public pension funds have been at the forefront of corporate
governance issues, especially in states where they have not been subject to statutory limitations with regard
to their equity investments 25. In the UK, the lead in criticizing nonperforming companies has been taken
by POSTEL (a  large previously public pension fund for postal and telecom workers), by Prudential (a
large insurance company) and by M&G (a large fund management company) 26.
A more  effective way of voicing  public criticism has been the  use of formal  associations of
pension funds (such as the Association of British Insurers and the National Association of Pension Funds
in the UK) or ad hoc groupings of interested institutional investors (such as the Institutional Shareholders
Committee  in the UK or the Council of Institutional Investors in the US).  The last-named group was
created ten years ago  and is a forum  for big shareholders to discuss corporate problems.  It regularly
25  Some concerns are, however, expressed about the incentives and constraints facing the managers
of public pension fuinds. For a critical stance, see Romano (1993).
26  The differences and  similarities in the  role of institutional investors in the  UK and the US  is
reviewed in Black and  V'offee  (1994).
36publishes a list of the 50 least performing companies and thus exerts pressure on the offending corporate
managers without exposing any individual shareholder or pension fund manager to the threat of corporate
retaliation.
Strengthening Corporate Governance Structures. Public criticism targeted at poor performers
fosters corrective action but does little to prevent the mistakes and abuses of corporate managers that have
treated their corporations as their personal fiefdoms and have effectively behaved as the feudal lords of
modem  times.  To forestall  such abuses, action needs to be taken to strengthen  corporate governance
structures  and  especially  to  increase  the  accountability  of  managers.  Well  functioning  corporate
governance  structures are  also essential for  protecting the  interests of minority  shareholders and  for
ensuring that  incumbent managers and/or corporate raiders do  not reap  large  gains at the expense of
uncoordinated shareholders with small stakes.
In both the US and the UK various bodies prepared and published reports outlining the reforms
that need to be implemented and underscoring the needed change in behavior of both company directors
and institutional shareholders.  In the US, the National Association of Corporate Directors  appointed a
Blue Ribbon Commission that studied and reported on the Performance Evaluation of Chief Executive
Officers,  Boards and Directors,  including guidelines for director  selection and  compensation (NACD
1994).  The Conference Board published several reports on corporate governance, including a report on
Corporate Boards: Improving and Evaluating Performance that reviewed recent developments in the US
and the  UK  (Conference Board  1994).  In the UK,  a  committee known  as the Cadbury  Committee
published a report entitled the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, that also set out a Code of Best
Practice (Cadbury Committee  1992).  In addition, the Institute of Directors commissioned an extensive
survey of directors from the Henley Management College.  These reports effectively argued that US and
UK corporate  boards were not until recently seriously concerned with measures to  improve their own
effectiveness and did not see a connection between board effectiveness and corporate performance.
The measures that are contemplated to strengthen corporate governance structures and improve
the effectiveness of corporate boards include the following: separating the functions of chairman and chief
executive officer and appointing nonexecutive chairmen in all companies above a certain size; electing
independent external directors; using cumulative voting for board elections; opening the proxy process to
allow greater communication among shareholders; using confidential voting at board meetings; expanding
the  role of board  committees that  are  independent of  executive directors; disclosing  the amount  and
rationale of managerial compensation; and opposing anti-takeover defenses that are designed to protect
incumbent managers at the expense of shareholders.  Of these measures, the use of cumulative voting for
board elections seems to be the most powerful tool for allowing institutional shareholders to elect directors
37that are truly  independent of corporate managers and play an active part in protecting the interests of
shareholders 2".
Extensive use of board committees to select and appoint chief executive officers (to avert  the
perpetuation of the business policies of incumbent management), vet managerial compensation (to prevent
excessive  packages  that  are  unrelated  to  performance),  approve  major  expansion  plans  (to  check
managerial tendencies for  empire-building), and evaluate and respond to friendly  and hostile bids (to
ensure that shareholders receive  maximum value from takeovers) creates effectively  a  two-tier  board
structure similar to the long-standing German practice, but without the board representation of workers
and the limited accountability of incumbent managers.
In addition, to protect minority shareholders, pension funds and other institutional investors have
advocated  regulations that  discourage the use  of multi-class shares and  pyramidal  structures,  require
adequate information disclosure, ensure that transactions with related-parties are effected on market terms
and conditions, and stimulate the creation of liquid and transparent markets.
The efforts exerted by various collective bodies, such as the Council of Institutional Investors, the
National  Association  of Corporate  Directors and the Conference Board  in the  US or the Institute of
Directors, the National Association of Pension Funds and the Association of British Insurers in the UK
to  spell  out the  duties and  responsibilities of board  directors and  emphasize the  benefits  of  greater
accountability of directors have increased awareness of these issues by large corporations.
But in addition, a small number of entities has also emerged  in both the US and the UK that
specialize in monitoring corporate governance practices by large corporations, not only in the US and the
UK but also in several countries around the world.  These include the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) and the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) in the US and Promotion of Nonexecutive
Directors (PRO NED) and Pensions and Investments Research Consultants (PIRC) in the UK.  Some of
these entities, and more especially ISS, effectively operate as rating agencies but instead of rating the
creditworthiness of different  companies, they rate the accountability of managers and their compliance
with international standards of corporate governance.  They play a crucial and influential role in advising
institutional investors on how to exercise their voting rights".
27  In this context, Gilson and Kraakman (1991) have argued that institutional investors should recruit
independent directors to monitor corporate behavior and performance on their behalf.
2R  As corporate governance rating agencies, these entities would be subject to the same constraints
of cost and effectiveness that affect the operations of credit and bond rating agencies.  Coffee  (1990)
highlights  the  dissatisfaction  with  the  slow  response of  bond  rating  agencies  in  the  1980s to  new
information.  Often, a rating change followed, rather than preceded, the market's  adverse reaction to a
deterioration in a corporation's  financial condition.
38Direct Influence and Specialized Monitors.  The final type of measures includes initiatives to
exert  more direct  influence on corporate policy and performance through significant equity stakes and
board representation.  Because pension funds are constrained by their diversification policies and lack of
inhouse managerial expertise from acquiring large equity stakes in individual companies and seeking board
representation, they have relied in the past on companies specializing in leveraged buy-outs, such as KKR
in the US, or on industrial conglomerates, such as the Hanson and BTR groups in the UK.  These groups
acquire outright control of targeted companies through tender offers and hostile takeovers.  They finance
their operations by issuing equity or debt and rely on their reputation as effective industrial managers for
raising funds from pension funds and other institutional investors.
More recently, a new technique has been developed in the US that avoids outright control  of
companies but involves a more incremental approach (Gordon and Pound 1992).  Under this approach,
specialized companies raise funds from institutional investors in order to acquire substantial equity stakes
in individual corporations and seek board representation with a view to influencing corporate policy.  One
form of this approach, exemplified by the Lens Fund operated by Robert Monks, involves nonnegotiated
purchases and aggressive tactics (such as public criticism and voting challenges) to induce change 29. An
alternative form relies on negotiated purchases that are welcome by incumbent managers and support them
in their expansion or restructuring policies.  This approach is exemplified by Berkshire Hathaway, a fund
operated by Warren Buffett.  The first form seeks to act as a catalyst in maximizing company value and
adopts a short or at most a medium term horizon.  In contrast, the second form operates as patient capital
and adopts a longer-term horizon.
C.  Unresolved Issues
Strategic Holdings,  Long-Term Commitment  and  Conflicts  of Interest.  The  recent  and
proposed changes seem to be a response to the mistakes and excesses of the 1980s.  Institutional investors
and other disgruntled shareholders were forced to take action to remove incumbent managers of heavily
underperforming corporations.  But except in the cases of leveraged buy-outs and the limited experience
with the  patient capital  approach, they  do no  appear to have addressed the  need to  develop strategic
investors  with  large  holdings  that  could  provide  long-term  support  and  commitment  to  corporate
management.  In the Euro-Asian model of corporate governance, such long-term commitment and support
has  long been  provided by  banks and other financial  institutions, as well  as by  controlling  industrial
groups, that have large stakes in different companies.  But among countries with funded pension schemes
and a large contractual savings industry, only South Africa appears to have developed such an approach.
29  The difficulties of these new approaches is highlighted by the failure of the Lens Fund, which is
organized as closed-end mutual fund, to raise capital from CALPERS and other public or private pension
funds (Coffee 1994).
39Strategic holdings  avoid the problems  of  "free riding"  and emphasis  on  short-term  corporate
performance  that  might  result  from the  fragmentation  of corporate  ownership.  They  also  limit  the
incidence of excessive managerial compensation since executive remuneration is controlled by the strategic
shareholders and  can be more  objectively  linked to  performance.  But the  shortcomings of strategic
holdings in the hands of a few institutions are the large concentration of economic power and the potential
conflicts of interest that exist between strategic investors and other groups of shareholders (the latter often
suffer from reduced voting rights and from limited access to information - Rock 1991).  Large strategic
stakes may also lead to uncompetitive practices in industrial sectors dominated by companies controlled
by the conglomerates, while the orientation of capital markets toward the financing of larger firns  may
inhibit access to external finance by new companies with dynamic prospects.  In the context of South
Africa, where strategic holdings by institutional investors are in widespread use, Vittas (1994) recommends
a triple burden of proof on proponents of conglomerates.  This should show that strategic holdings earn
risk-adjusted rates of return that are no lower than those obtained on portfolio holdings, that the industrial
sectors remain sufficiently competitive, and that smaller firms are not denied reasonable access to external
finance.
Costs and Benefits of Monitoring.  Effective monitoring takes time and requires the employment
of specialists and experts who understand the law and  are able to assess the performance  of different
corporations.  Pension  fund managers and trustees often  lack the  specialist knowledge that would  be
required to  second-guess the decisions and actions of corporate managers.  Moreover, even if they  did
have such knowledge, it would be difficult to quantify the benefits from improved monitoring.  For this
reason, most pension fund managers react more strongly on general points of principle, such as opposition
to  any  attempt  to  curtail  voting  rights  or  support  for  proposals to  strengthen  board  structure  and
independence rather than on more company specific issues, such as disputes over business strategy or the
competence  of  specific  corporate  managers.  The costs  of  monitoring  are  reduced  when  action  is
coordinated  by a  collective  body,  such as an association.  Working through a  collective  body  could
achieve economies of scale, especially for recurring issues and could more easily overcome the problems
caused by free riding.  For other initiatives, such as the use of specialized agencies, the cost of monitoring
may be an inhibiting factor.  Often, the threat of closer oversight may be more effective than reliance on
specialized agencies.  In this sense, collective bodies that keep corporate performance under general review
may be the most effective form of monitoring on a cost/benefit basis.
Long-Term  Effectiveness and the  Question of  "Who Monitors  the  Monitors".  Another
concern regards the long-term effectiveness of recent initiatives. Separating the functions of chairman and
chief executive officer will increase monitoring and oversight when it is first  instituted in response to a
need to curtail the entrenched power and influence of executive managers.  But there is no guarantee that
a nonexecutive chairman may not over time become as identified with the fortunes of the corporation as
its executive management. The same could also happen with independent nonexecutive directors who may
for  instance  indulge over  time in a similar dispensation of perquisites as the unaccountable corporate
managers did  in the ahsence of close monitoring and oversight.  Thus, institutional  investors as large
40shareholders will have to monitor the performance of nonexecutive chairmen and other directors.  Similar
problems may also arise in the case of independent collective bodies which may lose their independence
over time if they are captured by executive managers of large corporations.
Finally, the perennial question of "who monitors the monitors" will apply not only in the case of
these specialized monitors but also in the case of the managers of pension funds and other institutional
investors.  After all, the managers of these institutions act as agents for the large number of dispersed
beneficiaries.  These  are  the  active  and  passive  workers  that  are  members  of  pension  plans,  the
policyholders of insurance companies and the small investors who place their savings with mutual funds
and other financial institutions.  To ensure that recent initiatives retain long-term effectiveness and that
the  managers  of  pension funds  and  other  institutions serve  the  interests of  their  principals,  further
collective measures may be necessary such as govemment regulation and oversight, adequate information
disclosure and transparency, and greater involvement of public committees of informed but independent
observers and experts (Pound  1992).
The role of pension funds and other institutional investors in corporate govemance is still an issue
of intense debate.  As summarized in Coffee (1994), three different conceptions of the role of institutional
investors have been put forward.  The first, which is popular within the business community and a large
section of the academic community sees institutional investors as short-term oriented, and inclined towards
fads and  herd behavior.  The second view sees institutional investors as prevented by  legal rules and
promanager  conflicts  from adopting a more  active stance in corporate  affairs.  This view argues that
pension funds and other  institutional investors have economic  incentives to achieve gains from better
monitoring but are regulated into passivity.  The third view doubts that institutional investors have strong
incentives to monitor and argues that they may have a preference for liquidity and passivity.  In the real
world, it would seem that all three views have merit in explaining the current role of institutional investors
in corporate govemance.  The increasing reliance on  collective bodies, stronger  corporate  govemance
structures, and specialized monitors may represent an efficient and economical response to the challenge
posed by the decline of "exit" and the need to exercise more effective "voice".
V.  LESSONS  AND POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  FOR TRANSITIONAL  ECONOMIES
This paper examined the prospects for private pension funds in Central Europe and Russia and
their potential long-term role in corporate governance.  The following lessons and policy implications are
highlighted:
The countries reviewed, like all other transitional economies, have public pension systemsthat face
severe financial pressures and fail to provide adequate pension benefits to the majority of their pensioners.
41Although  radical  and fundamental  pension  reform may  not be politically  feasible  in the short-run
and may even be inadvisable  in the interest  of sustaining  political  support  for privatization  and enterprise
restructuring,  there can be little  doubt that in the longer  run a fundamental  pension  reform is unavoidable.
The experience  of more advanced  OECD countries  (and some innovating  developing  countries)
suggests  that the public pension  system  should  be downsized  and its benefits  rationalized  not only in order
to offer adequate  but affordable  and therefore  sustainable  benefits  but also in order to leave greater room
for the creation  and growth  of private pension  funds.
Private pension funds could be organized  on a voluntary  or mandatory  basis, could be based on
company schemes  or nonemployer-related  funds, and could be arranged as defined benefit or defined
contribution  plans.  The shortcomings  of company-based  defined benefit plans suggest  that transitional
countries should opt in the longer run in favor of nonemployer,  defined contribution  plans based on
individual  capitalization  accounts  with full and immediate  vesting,  full portability,  and full funding.
To cope with the need for a targeted  replacement  rate, such schemes  could operate  with variable
contribution  rates, re-set each year in accordance  with the salary growth  of each worker, the cumulative
investment  return on his or her account,  and the targeted  pension benefit.
Once established,  private pension  funds  will accumulate  long-term  financial  resources  at a rapid
pace. This will depend  on the coverage  of the schemes,  the rate of contribution,  the investment  retums,
and the rate of growth  of real wages. They are also likely  to have  a major impact  on the modernization
of securities markets, stimulating innovation,  fostering better accounting  and auditing standards, and
promoting  greater infonnation disclosure.
Their role in different  securities  markets  will be shaped  by future  regulations  on their investments
and by the traditions  that are likely  to emerge. In general,  given  the long-term  nature of their obligations,
pension funds could become major investors  in corporate  equities, though marketable  debt instruments
such as  government bonds, corporate bonds and mortgage bonds or  securitized mortgage-backed
instruments  could also benefit from their development.
The experience  of the more advanced OECD countries suggests that investments  should be
governed  by prudential  concerns,  should  favor sensible  diversification,  and should  emphasize  the pursuit
of investment  retums  commensurate  with the risks involved. Rigorous  accounting  and auditing  standards
and information  disclosure  to the regulatory  authorities  and their members  would be essential.
Their role in corporate  governance  will also depend  on regulation  and tradition. Pension funds
will face conflicting incentives,  pressures  and constraints. To diversify  their risks and protect the value
of funds under management,  they will be pressured  to acquire small equity holdings. But if they come
to dominate  the equity market,  the liquidity  of their holdings  may become  more illusory  than real. They
42will also be pressured  to adopt  a policy  of passive  portfolio  indexation  in an attempt  to keep costs down
and improve  their investment  performance. As a result,  a vacuum  in corporate  governance  may emerge,
with limited corporate  accountability,  unless  they become more actively involved  in exercising "voice"
in corporate  affairs and monitor  more intensively  the performance  of individual  corporations.
The experience  of the more advanced  OECD  countries  suggests  that pension funds  will be more
effective in  exercising "voice" in corporate affairs through collective bodies, through more robust
structures  of corporate  governance,  and through specialized  monitors. In this way, they could achieve
greater coordination,  keep monitoring costs down and avoid the problems of free riding.  However,
experience  with these initiatives  is relatively  recent and their long-term  effectiveness  remains  to be seen.
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Czech Rep.  Hungary  Poland  Russia
Minimum  Retirement Age:
Men  60  60  65  60
Women  53-57  55  60  55
Minimum Contributory Years:
Men  25  25  25  25
Women  25  25  20  20
Base for pension calculation:  Best  All Years  Best  Last
Years before retirement  5 of  10  since 1988  3 (10) of  12  2 (4 of  15)
Statutory Replacement Ratio:
Net  54%  67%  55%  56%
Nominal  50%  63%  55%  55%
Adjustments for longer working
periods (% per year):
Net  1.1%  I.1% (0.5%)  1.3%  1%
Nominal  1%  1% (0.5%)  1.3%  1%
Maximum Replacement Ratio:
Net  84%  80%  75%  76%
Nominal  78%  75%  75%  75%
Minimum pension (usually in  72%  93%  39%  100%
percent of minimum wage):  (of average)
Average pension (in percent of  49%  49%  74%  34%
average  wage):  ( 1991)
Nominal contribution rates for
pensions: Total  27.2%  30.5%  30%  32.6%
Employer  20.40%'o  24.5%  30%  31.6%
Employee  6.8%  6.0%  0%  1.0%
Effective contribution rates for
pension: Total  23%  24%  23%  25%
Employer  17%  20%  23%  24%
Employee  6%  5%  0%  1%° 
System Dependency Ratio:
1992  49%  59%  49%  46%
2020  62% (2016)  72%
Old Age Dependency Ratio:
1992  32%  36%  28%  31%
2020  44%  54%  44%  50%
2050  58%  61%  56%  58%
Pensions in percent of GDP  10.2%  10.6%  14.8%  4.6%
Social Security  in % of GDP  21%  27.6%  19.9%  5.2%
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Pension Fund and Life Insurance Assets
(Percent of GNP)
1970  1980  1990
Canada  31  31  46(3)
France  6  7  13(2)
Germany  10  14  22
Japan  8  13  41
Netherlands  45  63  107
Sweden  42  51  63
Switzerland  5  1  70  133(1)
UK  43  46  97
US  43  49  75
(1) 1987; (2)  1988; (3) 1989
Source:  Davis (1993), Vittas and Skully (1991)
45Table 6
Asset Allocations of Pension Funds
(percent of assets)
Real Assets  Debt Instruments
Canada
1970  23  77
1980  23  77
1990  32  68
Germany
1970  16  84
1980  18  82
1990  24  76
Japan
1970  33  67
1980  15  85
1990  29  71
Netherlands
1970  27  73
1980  19  81
1990  31  69
Switzerland
1970  19  81
1980  27  73
1990  33  67
United Kingdom
1970  59  41
1980  70  30
1990  72  28
United States
1970  45  55
1980  41  59
1990  46  54
Note:  Real assets include equities and real estate; debt instruments include government, corporate and mortgage bonds, loans and
short term assets
Source:  Davis (1993)
46Table 7
Real Pension Fund Returns
(Standard Deviations in brackets)
1966-  1971-  1976-  1981-  1986-  1966-
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1990
Canada  -3.3  -1.4  -1.2  6.1  7.9  1.6
(1.4)  (11.7)  (4.0)  (15.1)  (6.7)  (9.8)
Denmark  -1.9  -1.3  0.8  17.7  -1.8  3.6
(8.7)  (12.7)  (4.4)  (14.6)  (10.3)  (12.7)
Germany  5.0  3.3  3.3  7.7  6.3  5.1
(3.3)  (2.7)  (4.4)  (4.9)  (5.9)  (4.4)
Japan  0.1  -0.5  -1.2  10.9  13.8  4.0
(5.3)  (10.9)  (5.3)  (2.1)  (7.8)  (9.4)
Netherlands  1.7  -1.4  2.0  10.5  6.3  4.0
(3.3)  (5.5)  (3.0)  (4.0)  (5.4)  (6.0)
Sweden  1.2  -3.5  -5.3  3.9  4.7  0.2
(8.2)  (6.7)  (5.6)  (4.9)  (9.3)  (7.6)
Switzerland  0.8  -0.5  4.0  3.0  -0.2  1.5
(0.0)  (6.3)  (8.0)  (5.4)  (7.2)  (6.4)
UK  4.2  -2.8  4.9  12.4  10.1  5.8
(11.5)  (19.4)  (5.2)  (7.3)  (12.7)  (12.5)
US  -5.4  -0.8  -1.9  8.1  11.2  2.2
(6.5)  (13.8)  (6.9)  (13.0)  (12.2)  (11.9)
Source:  Davis (1993)
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